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1.	Introduction		
	
The	year	2011	began	with	a	series	of	popular	uprisings	across	the	Middle	East	that	toppled	
various	authoritarian	regimes	and	which	was	largely	regarded	as	the	region’s	turn	to	modern	
democracy.	However,	 six	 years	 later	 the	outcomes	of	 these	 revolts	 seem	 less	 rosy.	While	
regime	change	took	place	in,	for	example	Tunisia	and	Egypt,	the	violent	removal	of	Muammar	
Gaddafi	 in	 Libya	and	 the	armed	uprising	against	 Syria’s	Bashar	al-Assad	have	plunged	 the	
latter	two	countries	into	civil	war.1	In	addition,	in	the	wake	of	the	U.S.	withdrawal	from	Iraq	
(2011),	a	violent	insurgency	has	swept	the	country	and	eventually	resulted	in	the	capture	of	
large	cities	and	 territories	 in	Northern	 Iraq	by	a	 terrorist	organization	 that	would	become	
known	as	the	Islamic	State	(IS).2	
	 Apart	from	its	violent	campaign	in	Iraq,	in	2013	the	IS	crossed	into	Syria	(taking	
advantage	 of	 its	 civil	war)	where	 it	 too	 captured	 large	 swaths	 of	 land.	 In	 2014,	 after	 the	
capture	 of	 Mosul,	 Iraq’s	 second	 largest	 city,	 the	 terrorist	 organization	 announced	 the	
reinstatement	of	the	Caliphate,	with	its	leader	Abu	Bakr	al-Baghdadi	to	become	the	Caliph.3	
They	urged	Muslims	throughout	the	world	to	migrate	to	the	Caliphate	or	to	at	least	pledge	
their	allegiance	to	the	new	Caliph.	As	a	result,	thousands	of	jihadists	made	their	way	to	Syria	
and	 Iraq	 and	 even	 more	 individuals	 and	 terrorist	 groups	 from	 across	 the	 globe	 aligned	
themselves	with	the	organisation.4		
	 While	both	Syria	and	Iraq	experienced	high	levels	of	violence	and	insecurity	at	
the	time	of	the	IS’s	rise,	their	rapid	conquest	surprised	many	observers.	What	surprised	them	
even	more	was	the	fact	that	al-Qaeda	Central	(AQC),5	publicly	disavowed	the	organization.	
This	is	strange	for	a	number	of	reasons:	the	IS	used	to	be	an	al-Qaeda	affiliate	(al-Qaeda	in	
Iraq);	 AQC	 too	 aspires	 to	 establish	 a	 (global)	 Caliphate;	 the	 IS	 quickly	 became	 the	 most	
																																																						
1	I.	Salamey,	‘Post-Arab	Spring:	changes	and	challenges’,	in	Third	World	Quarterly	36	(2015)	No.1,	p.	112.	
2	A.	S.	Hashim,	‘The	Islamic	State:	from	Al-Qaeda	Affiliate	to	Caliphate’,	in	Middle	East	Policy	XXI	(2014)	No.	4,	
pp.	75;	Note:	The	group	now	known	as	the	Islamic	State	has	changed	names	several	times	over	the	past	couple	
of	 years.	 In	 the	 introduction,	 the	 paper	 will	 refer	 to	 the	 Islamic	 State,	 in	 later	 chapters	 the	 group’s	
transformation,	in	addition	to	its	name	changes,	will	be	discussed.		
3	BBC,	‘Isis	rebels	declare	'Islamic	state'	in	Iraq	and	Syria’,	BBC	(June	30,	2014),	retrieved	November	7,	2017	
from:	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28082962.	
4	D.	Milton,	M.	al-‘Ubaydi,	‘Pledging	Bay`a:	A	Benefit	or	Burden	to	the	Islamic	State?’,	in	CTC	Sentinel	8	(March	
2015)	no.	3,	pp.	1-2.	
5	After	the	2001	invasion	of	Afghanistan	the	central	leadership	of	al-Qaeda	relocated	to	the	border	region	of	
Afghanistan	–	Pakistan,	from	which	it	established	multiple	affiliated	groups	across	the	world.	This	will	be	
discussed	in	more	detail	in	chapter	2.4.	
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powerful	terrorist	group	in	the	region,	if	not	the	world.	However,	to	scholars	like	B.J.	Philips,	
S.	Nemeth,	and	T.	Bacon,	the	event	should	have	been	less	of	a	shock.	To	them	the	relationship	
between	the	IS	and	al-Qaeda	can	be	said	to	be	clear	evidence	of	cooperation	and	competition	
between	terrorist	groups,	which	they	have	all	studied.		
	 Even	though	these	theories	describe	two	opposite	relationships,	the	described	
effects	 of	 these	 links	 are	 fairly	 similar.	 Both	 phenomena	 can	 be	 said	 to	 positively	 affect	
terrorist	organizations,	as	they	commonly	increase	the	endurance	as	well	as	the	lethality	of	
groups.	However,	it	can	be	argued	that	groups	seek	cooperation	specifically	to	improve	their	
situation,	while	competition	arises	largely	by	accident.	Additionally,	it	should	be	noted	that	
while	scholars	agree	that	competition	can	strengthen	a	group’s	cause,	the	effects	can	also	
severely	damage	an	organization	or	lead	to	their	demise.		
	 Whereas	al-Qaeda	has	given	an	official	statement	on	their	decision	to	break	ties	
with	the	IS,	and	has	initiated	a	campaign	to	discredit	the	organization,	their	account	naturally	
fails	 to	address	 the	underlying	motivations	between	the	split.	By	using	 the	theories	about	
terrorist	cooperation	and	competition,	this	thesis	seeks	to	provide	an	academic	explanation	
as	to:		
	
Why	did	al-Qaeda	break	ties	with	the	Islamic	State	in	2014?		
	
To	 answer	 the	 research	 question,	 this	 thesis	will	 use	 the	 theories	 about	 cooperation	 and	
competition	between	terrorist	organizations.	The	split	between	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS	has	been	
discussed	in	the	news,	and	by	scholars,	but	no	studies	have	sought	to	explain	the	break	up	by	
making	use	of	the	theories	about	terrorist	competition.	Hence,	this	thesis	seeks	to	improve	
the	academic	debate	around	this	historic	breakup,	and	provide	an	explanation	that	takes	into	
account	the	underlying	processes	that	motivated	the	complicated	relationship	between	the	
two	 organisations.	 Such	 an	 explanation	 addresses	 gaps	 in	 our	 knowledge	 about	 the	 links	
between	the	two	groups	and	their	behaviour	towards	each	other.	In	addition,	this	thesis	seeks	
to	 further	 improve	 our	 understanding	 of	 cooperation	 and	 competition	 between	 terrorist	
organizations,	as	the	case	of	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS	provides	an	excellent	opportunity	to	test	
these	theories	in	a	real-world	scenario.		
The	 answer	 to	 this	 research	 question	 will	 first	 of	 all	 provide	 a	 better	
understanding	of	the	links	between	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS.	Secondly,	as	their	affair	is	both	an	
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example	of	cooperation	and	competition,	the	thesis	will	provide	an	excellent	example	of	how	
these	kinds	of	relationships	affect	terrorist	organizations.	Finally,	a	better	understanding	of	
the	links	between	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS,	 in	addition	to	a	better	understanding	of	how	these	
relations	affect	terrorist	organizations,	will	lead	to	a	better	understanding	as	to	why	the	two	
organizations	are	now	at	odds	with	each	other.	Such	an	understanding	will	not	only	add	to	
the	academic	debate	about	cooperation	and	competition	between	terrorist	groups,	but	can	
also	be	useful	to	policymakers	who	are	tasked	with	counterterrorism	efforts.		
	 The	timeframe	for	this	study	is	 limited	to	the	period	between	2004,	when	al-
Qaeda	 and	 the	 IS’s	 predecessor	 formalized	 their	 alliance,	 and	 July	 2017	 when	 the	 IS	
increasingly	began	to	lose	ground	after	their	defeat	in	Mosul.	However,	as	this	thesis	seeks	to	
give	a	better	understanding	of	the	two	organizations	it	will	first	discuss	their	origins,	which	
date	 further	 back	 than	 2004.	 After	 the	 histories	 of	 both	 groups	 have	 been	 described,	 in	
addition	to	why	they	formed	an	alliance,	the	thesis	will	discuss	the	common	narrative	behind	
their	 break	 up.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 thesis	 will	 analyse	 three	 key	 developments	 in	 the	
relationship	 between	 al-Qaeda	 and	 the	 IS	 by	 applying	 the	 theories	 on	 cooperation	 and	
competition	 to	 the	 case.	 First,	 al-Qaeda’s	 decision	 to	 form	 an	 alliance	 with	 the	 IS’s	
predecessor	in	2004	will	be	analysed.	Thereafter	their	falling	out	in	2014	and	the	aftermath	
of	the	split	2014-2017	will	be	studied.		
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2.	Literature	Review	
	
2.1.	Introduction	and	Definitions		
	
This	thesis	uses	the	Oxford	Dictionary	definition	of	terrorism,	which	states	that	terrorism	is	
“the	unlawful	use	of	violence	and	intimidation,	especially	against	civilians,	in	the	pursuit	of	
political	aims”.6	The	study	also	limits	itself	to	the	use	of	terrorism	by	non-state	actors,	though	
it	acknowledges	that	states	can	also	use	terrorist	tactics.		
Before	 discussing	 the	 available	 theories	 about	 cooperation	 and	 competition	
between	 terrorist	organizations,	 this	 literature	 review	will	 first	discuss	why	certain	groups	
decide	to	engage	in	terrorist	acts	as	a	way	to	achieve	their	goals.	In	this	study	the	work	of	P.	
Rogers	and	E.	Neumayer	&	T.	Plümber	will	be	used	to	define	terrorist	organizations	and	to	
explain	 why	 they	 revert	 to	 terrorist	 tactics	 as	 a	 way	 to	 obtain	 their	 goals.	 The	 thesis	
acknowledges	that	there	are	other	studies	to	help	explain	this	phenomenon,	but	has	chosen	
to	use	these	two	studies	because	they	present	terrorist	organizations	as	political	actors,	and	
the	use	of	terrorism	as	a	strategic	choice.	These	definitions	have	been	chosen	because,	unlike	
other	studies	of	terrorism,	they	help	to	explain	why	terrorist	organizations	can	cooperate	or	
compete	with	each	other.		
	
2.2.	Why	Organizations	Use	Terrorism	
	
According	to	Rogers,	terrorist	groups	can	best	be	viewed	as	political	actors.	However,	as	their	
ideas	 are	 often	 viewed	 to	 be	 too	 radical	 by	 the	 political	 establishment	 and	 the	 general	
population,	they	are	largely	excluded	from	political	participation.	Rogers	argues	that	in	this	
situation	these	organizations	revert	to	terrorism	mainly	as	a	way	to	nonetheless	spread	their	
message,	 gather	 support	 and	 pressure	 the	 political	 decision	makers.	 In	 addition	 to	 being	
excluded	from	the	regular	political	process,	these	groups	face	an	asymmetry	with	regards	to	
power,	 numbers,	 and	 funding	 versus	 the	 government.	 They	 therefore	 revert	 to	 non-
conventional	tactics	as	a	means	to	obtain	their	goals.	For	example,	by	deliberately	targeting	
																																																						
6	Oxford	Dictionary,	‘Terrorism’,	retrieved	October	5,	2017	from:	
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism.	
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non-combatants,	they	hope	to	coerce	the	political	establishment	 into	making	concessions.	
Additionally,	 they	use	 terror	 attacks	 to	escalate	 tensions	 already	present	 in	 societies,	 this	
mainly	serves	to	gather	more	support	and	thus	political	leverage.7		
Neumayer	and	Plümber	argue	that	the	decision	to	use	terrorism	as	a	means	to	
achieve	one’s	political	goals	is	a	strategic	decision	which	often	serves	to	obtain	the	terrorist’s	
intermediate	goals.	These	objectives	often	include:	generate	media	attention	(as	a	means	to	
promote	the	terrorist’s	cause);	increase	the	cost	of	political	stability	(as	a	result	of	for	example	
increased	spending	on	defense	and	counter-terrorism);	and	alienate	the	target	population	
from	the	government	(as	a	way	to	increase	popular	support).8	For	example,	the	use	of	suicide	
bombings	by	al-Qaeda	in	Iraq	against	the	Shia	population	can	be	said	to	perfectly	serve	these	
intermediate	 goals.	 Suicide	 bombings	 are	 not	 only	 a	 successful	 tool	 to	 generate	 media	
attention,	they	are	also	hard	to	prevent	and	therefore	force	the	government	to	spend	more	
on	 security.	 Moreover,	 by	 deliberately	 targeting	 the	 Shia	 population,	 tensions	 between	
Sunni’s	and	Shiites	in	Iraq	increased.		
	
2.3.	Terrorist	Organizations	and	Cooperation	
		
As	 this	 study	 will	 show,	 both	 al-Qaeda	 and	 the	 IS	 have	 established	 a	 number	 of	 official	
affiliated	groups,	in	addition	to	a	number	of	groups	that	have	voiced	their	support	for	their	
cause.	 Even	 though	 most	 of	 these	 jihadist	 organizations	 aspire	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	
(worldwide)	 Caliphate,	 their	 primary	 objectives	 are	 often	 local.	 The	 decision	 to	 form	
international	alliances	seems	rather	odd.	Why	than	do	these	organizations	seek	to	cooperate	
with	each	other,	and	what	are	the	effects	of	these	joint	ventures?	It	should	be	noted	that	
there	is	little	debate	regarding	this	question,	rather	the	handful	of	scholars	who	have	added	
to	the	discussion	complement	each	other.		
	 This	thesis	has	defined	terrorist	groups	as	essentially	political	actors.	Therefore,	
T.	 Bacon’s	 assertion	 that	 alliances	 are	 common	 practice	 between	 (international)	 political	
																																																						
7	P.	Rogers,	‘Terrorism’,	in	P.	D.	Williams	(ed.)	Security	Studies	an	Introduction	(2013,	Routledge	New	York)	pp.	
223-224.	
8	E.	Neumayer,	T.	Plümber,	‘International	Terrorism	and	the	Clash	of	Civilizations’,	in	British	Journal	of	Political	
Science	39	(October	2009)	no.	4,	p.	717.	
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units,	without	regard	to	time	and	place,	can	also	be	applied	to	terrorist	groups.9	Due	to	their	
secretive	nature	terrorist	groups	face	hurdles	in	forming	alliances	that	are	largely	absent	with	
cooperation	between	other	political	groups.	According	to	N.	A.	Bapat	and	K.	D.	Bond,	such	
obstacles	are	caused	by	the	fact	that	terrorist	organizations	who	seek	to	form	alliances	often	
face	a	commitment	problem.	This	commitment	problem	is	caused	by	the	fact	that	terrorist	
organizations	often	lack	transparency,	which	damages	their	credibility.	Therefore,	groups	can	
never	be	entirely	sure	that	their	cooperative	agreements	will	be	fulfilled.10	Bacon	echoes	this	
assertion	and	adds	that	terrorist	organizations,	unlike	states,	are	unable	to	set	up	institutions	
that	could	help	to	overcome	this	distrust.	While	cooperation	in	the	international	sphere	is	
increasingly	being	overseen,	and	enforced,	by	third	party	 institutions,	such	institutions	are	
naturally	 absent	 between	 terrorist	 organizations.	 As	 a	 result,	 terrorist	 organizations	 are	
inclined	to	use	cooperation	opportunistically.11	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 commitment	 problem,	 terrorist	 organizations	 face	 a	 number	 of	
other	 problems	 with	 regards	 to	 cooperation.	 Bacon	 argues	 that	 they	 face	 a	 security-
autonomy	 trade-off,	 as	 cooperation	 often	 includes	 ceding	 some	 degree	 of	 independent	
decision	 making.	 While	 a	 partner	 could	 provide	 extra	 security,	 exchanging	 some	
independence	 could	aggravate	members	of	 the	group,	especially	 if	 in-group	 identities	are	
strong.	 An	 alliance	 also	 poses	 the	 threat	 of	 being	 ill	 perceived	 by	 the	 real	 or	 perceived	
constituents	 of	 the	 group,	 especially	 if	 the	 ally	 engages	 in	 behavior	 that	 is	 viewed	 as	
unacceptable	by	this	group.	Forming	alliances,	Bacon	warns,	could	also	result	in	an	increase	
of	pressure	by	counterterrorism	forces,	as	they	are	alarmed	by	the	threat	of	an	alliance.	Bacon	
reinforces	this	argument	by	stating	that	an	alliance	also	increases	the	risk	of	betrayals	and	
leaks.12	B.	J.	Philips	in	addition	argues	that	an	alliance	can	cause	dependence	and	can	even	
lead	to	competition,	though	it	should	be	noted	that	most	cases	of	competition	exist	regardless	
of	prior	cooperation.	The	next	chapter	will	discuss	the	negative	effects	which	competition	can	
cause	for	an	organization.13	
																																																						
9	T.	Bacon,	‘Alliance	Hubs:	Focal	Points	in	the	International	Terrorist	Landscape’,	in	Perspectives	on	Terrorism	8	
(2014)	no.	4,	p.	6.	
10	N.	A.	Bapat,	K.	D.	Bond,	‘Alliances	between	Militant	Groups’,	in	British	Journal	of	Political	Science	42	(2012)	
no.	4,	p.	794.		
11	T.	Bacon,	‘Alliance	Hubs’,	pp.	7-8.	
12	Ibid.		
13	B.	J.	Phillips,	‘Terrorist	Group	Cooperation	and	Longevity’,	in	International	Studies	Quarterly	58	(2014)	no.	2,	
p.	337.	
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If	terrorist	organizations	manage	to	overcome	the	commitment	problem	in	addition	
to	overcoming	the	internal	and	external	pressures	with	regards	to	cooperation,	the	benefits	
of	cooperation	can	be	multiple.	A	number	of	scholars,	 including,	Bapat,	Bond,	and	Phillips	
have	asserted	that	cooperation	allows	organizations	to	pool	their	resources	(both	material	
and	human),	which	should	increase	military	strength.14	Moreover,	Bapat	and	Bond	argue	that	
cooperation	amongst	terrorist	organizations	allows	them	to	specialize,	and	focus	on	their	own	
area	of	operations.	This	 is	especially	 the	case	 for	organizations	 that	are	active	 in	a	similar	
region	and	face	a	common	enemy.15	In	addition,	scholars	like	M.	C.	Horowitz	and	K.	Craign,	
agree	 that	 cooperation	 between	 terrorist	 groups	 facilitates	 the	 diffusion	 of	 tactics	 and	
ideologies,	 such	as	 the	use	of	 suicide	bombings.16	As	a	 result,	 it	 is	widely	 recognized	 that	
terrorist	organizations	with	(multiple)	allies	become	more	lethal.17	
Similarly,	Phillips	has	found	that	cooperation	between	terrorist	groups	can	increase	
their	longevity.	This	can	be	attributed	to	several	factors,	including	the	pooling	of	resources,	
support	and	recruits.	In	addition,	cooperation	between	groups	can	help	them	to	overcome	
mobilization	 concerns.	 Phillips	 attributes	 this	 aspect	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 terrorist	 groups	with	
allies	are	usually	able	to	carry	out	more	deadly	and	sophisticated	attacks	these	can	then	serve	
as	 fresh	 propaganda	 to	 gather	 fresh	 recruits	 and	 finances.18	 Philips	 also	 introduces	 the	
concept	of	eigenvector	centrality,	which	 refers	 to	 the	 indirect	 connection	 to	other	groups	
through	 allies.	 Groups	 with	 a	 central	 position	 within	 a	 network,	 with	 multiple	 (in)direct	
connections,	such	as	the	IS	and	al-Qaeda,	can	maximize	the	profits	of	cooperation	and	thus	
are	likely	to	endure	longer.19		
	
2.4.	Terrorist	Organizations	and	Competition		
	
																																																						
14	N.	A.	Bapat,	K.	D.	Bond,	‘Alliances	between	Militant	Groups’,	p.	795;	B.	J.	Phillips,	‘Terrorist	Group	
Cooperation	and	Longevity’,	p.	337.	
15	N.	A.	Bapat,	K.	D.	Bond,	‘Alliances	between	Militant	Groups’,	p.	795.		
16	M.	C.	Horowitz,	‘Nonstate	Actors	and	the	Diffusion	of	Innovations:	The	Case	of	Suicide	Terrorism’,	in	
International	Organization	64	(2010)	no.	1,	pp.	35-37;	K.	Craign,	Sharing	the	Dragon's	Teeth:	Terrorist	Groups	
and	the	Exchange	of	New	Technologies	(Santa	Monica:	RAND	Corporation,	2006).		
17	See	for	example:	B.	J.	Phillips,	‘Terrorist	Group	Cooperation	and	Longevity’,	p.	337;	T.	Bacon,	‘Alliance	Hubs’,	
p.	5;	V.	Asal,	R.	K.	Rethemeyer,	‘The	Nature	of	the	Beast:	Organizational	Structures	and	the	Lethality	of	
Terrorist	Attacks’,	in	The	Journal	of	Politics	70	(2008)	No.	2,	p.	440.	
18	B.	J.	Phillips,	‘Terrorist	Group	Cooperation	and	Longevity’,	pp.	337-338.		
19	Idem	p.	338.		
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As	the	split	between	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS	has	shown,	competition	between	terrorist	groups	
also	exists.	Surprisingly	the	effects	of	competition	between	groups	can	be	said	to	be	fairly	
similar	to	the	effects	that	have	been	discussed	with	regards	to	cooperation.	In	the	scholarly	
debate	about	competition	between	terrorist	organizations,	the	outbidding	thesis	is	the	most	
often-cited	theory,	it	is	however	not	undisputed.		
The	outbidding	theory	can	best	be	explained	through	the	lens	of	Rogers	in	addition	to	
Neumayer	 and	 Plümber,	 who	 regard	 terrorist	 organizations	 as	 largely	 political	 actors.	 S.	
Nemeth	explains	that,	in	short,	the	theory	holds	that	as	organizations	are	competing	over	a	
similar	 pool	 of	 recruits	 and	 public	 support,	 they	 will	 use	 increasing	 levels	 of	 violence	 to	
demonstrate	their	commitment	and	capabilities	versus	the	other	organizations.	As	a	result,	
even	moderate	groups	are	forced	to	engage	in	more	extreme	attacks.	Consequently,	states	
will	experience	increasing	levels	of	violence	as	violence	becomes	the	currency	for	terrorist	
organizations,	which	will	legitimize	and	encourage	ever	increasing	levels	of	violence.20		
According	to	A.	H.	Kydd	and	B.	F.	Walter,	the	escalating	violence	that	characterizes	
outbidding	also	has	a	tendency	to	target	objectives	that	might	be	of	lesser	importance	to	the	
attacking	group.	Attacks	are	increasingly	designed	to	show	determination	and	power,	which	
also	helps	to	explain	why	terrorist	attacks	continue	in	an	environment	where	they	are	unlikely	
to	 produce	 any	 (political)	 results.21	 M.G.	 Findley	 and	 J.	 K.	 Young	 add	 to	 the	 theory	 that	
outbidding	will	likely	intensify	when	there	are	multiple	groups	competing	for	the	support	of	
a	similar	segment	of	the	population.	Ethnic,	cultural,	and	religious	differences	between	the	
competing	 groups	will	 further	 escalate	 the	 violence.22	 As	will	 be	 discussed	 later,	 the	 split	
between	 al-Qaeda	 and	 the	 IS	 occurred	 in	 an	 environment	 where	 multiple	 parties	 were	
competing	for	popular	support.	
In	a	situation	of	terrorist	outbidding,	suicide	attacks	are	often	seen	as	the	pinnacle	of	
dedication	to	a	cause,	and	once	the	tactic	has	been	used	by	one	party	it	can	be	argued	that	
others	will	have	to	follow	suit.	Moreover,	in	line	with	this	kind	of	reasoning,	B.	Acosta	argues	
that	a	terrorist	group’s	longevity	can	increases	as	a	result	of	the	adoption	of	suicide	attacks.	
Suicide	attacks	require	extensive	planning	and	need	a	strong	in-group	identity	as	they	involve	
																																																						
20	S.	Nemeth,	’The	Effect	of	Competition	on	Terrorist	Group	Operations’,	in	Journal	of	Conflict	Resolution	58	
(2014)	no.2,	p.	337.	
21	A.	H.	Kydd,	B.	F.	Walter,	‘The	Strategies	of	Terrorism’,	in	International	Security	31	(2006)	No.	1,	p.	77.	
22	M.	G.	Findley,	J.	K.	Young,	‘More	Combatant	Groups,	More	Terror?	Empirical	Tests	of	an	Outbidding	Logic’,	in	
Terrorism	and	Political	Violence	24	(2012)	no.5,	pp.	708-709.	
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the	voluntary	sacrifice	of	a	group	member.	According	to	Acosta,	suicide	attacks	are	thus	the	
perfect	 tactic	 to	 show	how	determined	 a	 group	 is,	 and	will	 likely	 bring	 in	 new	 recruits.23	
However,	M.	Bloom,	who	has	largely	been	responsible	for	this	notion	of	the	outbidding	thesis,	
emphasizes	that	the	social	environment	in	which	suicide	attacks	occur	has	to	be	supportive	
of	such	extreme	forms	of	violence.	When	there	is	no	popular	support	for	suicide	attacks,	the	
adoption	of	the	modus	operandi	might	alienate	support.24		
Nemeth	explains	that,	in	a	setting	where	there	is	limited	support	for	extreme	violence,	
such	as	suicide	attacks,	competition	can	still	intensify.	Groups	that	refrain	from	using	extreme	
violence,	in	order	to	maintain	support,	will	try	to	free-ride	on	the	efforts	of	other	groups.	This	
further	 exacerbates	 the	 collective	 action	 problem	 that	 all	 terrorist	 groups	 face.	 In	 this	
situation,	groups	are	still	competing	with	each	other,	but	outbidding	as	described	above	will	
largely	remain	absent.	In	cases	where	one	group	uses	extreme	violence,	and	other	groups	try	
to	free-ride	on	its	effects,	violence	might	actually	decrease	according	to	Nemeth.25		
The	outbidding	thesis	has	also	been	discussed	with	regards	to	the	terrorist	group’s	
ideology.	 With	 regards	 to	 ideology,	 the	 distinction	 between	 secular	 and	 religious	
organizations	is	most	prevalent.	According	to	J.	Piazza,	most	religious	groups	are	likely	to	view	
their	 struggle	 as	 a	 battle	 between	 “good	 and	 evil”,	 hence	 they	 are	 less	 concerned	 about	
winning	over	the	“hearts	and	minds”	of	the	general	population.	Secular	organizations	are	far	
more	concerned	with	winning	over	the	support	of	the	people.	In	a	situation	of	competition,	
Piazza	argues	that	religious	groups	are	more	likely	to	adopt	an	outbidding	strategy	than	their	
secular	counterparts.26	Nemeth	notes	that	when	terrorist	groups	receive	state	support,	they	
become	less	concerned	with	winning	over	popular	support	and	are	likely	to	escalate	violence	
in	a	competitive	environment.27	
While	the	effects	of	terrorist	competition	as	described	by	the	outbidding	thesis	can	be	
said	to	be	predominantly	positive,	authors	like	P.	Staniland	argue	that	the	effects	might	be	
negative	as	well.	This	is	especially	true	when	the	competition	between	groups	turns	violent.	
																																																						
23	B.	Acosta,	‘Dying	for	survival:	Why	militant	organizations	continue	to	conduct	suicide	
attacks’,	in	Journal	of	Peace	Research	53	(January	2016)	no.	2,	pp.	5-6.	
24	M.	Bloom,	‘Dying	to	Kill:	Devising	a	Theory	of	Suicide	Terror’,	Paper	for	Presentation	to	the	Harrington	
Workshop	on	Terrorism	(2005)	pp.	117-118.	
25	S.	Nemeth,	’The	Effect	of	Competition	on	Terrorist	Group	Operations’,	pp.	340-341.	
26	J.	Piazza,	‘Is	Islamist	Terrorism	More	Dangerous?	An	Empirical	Study	of	Group	Ideology,	Organization,	and	
Goal	Structure’,	in	Terrorism	and	Political	Violence	21	(2009)	no.	1,	pp.	64-65;	S.	Nemeth,	’The	Effect	of	
Competition	on	Terrorist	Group	Operations’,	pp.	342-343.	
27	Ibid.		
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Attacks	against	each	other	not	only	directly	damage	the	groups,	as	members	are	killed,	but	
can	 also	 lead	members	 to	 defect	 or	 disengage.	 This	 form	 of	 competition,	 referred	 to	 as	
fratricide	by	Staniland,	often	occurs	when	a	 faction	within	a	group	 tries	 to	consolidate	 its	
power	and	push	for	more	control.	Fratricide	can	also	amount	when	factions	compete	over	
personality,	 terrain,	 and	 resource	 flows.	 Staniland	 notes	 that	 in	 such	 a	 situation,	 the	
government	could	try	to	attract	defectors	and	use	them	as	intelligence	assets.28	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
28	P.	Staniland,	‘Between	a	Rock	and	a	Hard	Place:	Insurgent	Fratricide,	Ethnic	Defection,	and	the	Rise	of	
Pro-State	Paramilitaries’,	in	The	Journal	of	Conflict	Resolution,	Vol.	56	(2012)	No.	1	pp.	20-23.		
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3.	Salafist	Jihadism,	al-Qaeda	and	the	Islamic	State		
	
3.1.	Introduction		
	
To	understand	why	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS	eventually	broke	ties	with	each	other,	even	though	
the	two	organisations	adhere	to	the	Salafist	Jihadist29	 ideology,	 it	will	first	be	necessary	to	
discuss	the	latter	movement.	Thereafter	the	origins	of	the	two	former	organizations	will	be	
discussed,	as	this	too	will	shed	light	on	the	reasons	behind	their	break	up.	For	chronological	
purposes	al-Qaeda	will	first	be	introduced	after	which	the	IS	will	be	discussed.	The	last	part	
of	this	chapter	will	elaborate	on	the	split	between	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS.	
	
3.2.	Salafist	Jihadism	
	
Salafist	Muslims	adhere	to	a	very	strict	interpretation	of	the	Quran	and	the	teachings	of	the	
Prophet	Muhammad.	The	ideology	is	often	equated	with	Wahhabism,	after	the	eighteenth	
century	Salafist	scholar	Muhammad	ibn	Abd	al-Wahhab,	and	is	particularly	popular	on	the	
Arabian	Peninsula.30	Salafism	is	concerned	with	an	idealized	Islamic	world	and	seeks	to	re-
model	the	present-day	world	by	 looking	to	the	time	of	the	Prophet	 in	an	effort	to	restore	
Islam	to	its	origins.31	The	ideology	gained	popularity	in	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	
which	can	best	be	attributed	to	the	fact	that	it	promises	a	renewed	vision	of	power	and	glory.	
At	the	time	it	appealed	to	the	resentment,	disenfranchisement	and	disillusion	among	Sunni	
Arabs.	These	feelings	in	part	originated	from	the	region’s	struggle	with	its	colonial	past,	the	
consequences	of	decolonisation	(for	example	the	fact	that	Arab	regimes	modelled	themselves	
after	 western	 states),	 and	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Caliphate.32	 Salafists	 became	
convinced	that	 the	West	and	the	 Jews	were	engaged	 in	a	cultural,	economic,	and	military	
struggle	 to	 destroy	 the	 religion	 of	 Islam.	 According	 to	 Salafists,	 the	 modern	 Arab	 states	
																																																						
29	It	should	be	noted	that	not	all	Salafists	preach	jihad,	however	the	majority	of	them	do.	For	the	purpose	of	
this	paper	I	will	nevertheless	use	the	term	Salafists	to	refer	to	those	organizations	that	preach	jihad.		
30	B.	Haykel,	‘ISIS	and	al-	Qaeda—What	Are	They	Thinking?	Understanding	the	Adversary’,	in	The	Annals	of	the	
American	Academy	of	Political	and	Social	Science	668	(2016)	no.	1,	pp.	71-72.	
31	J.	Turner,	‘From	Cottage	Industry	to	International	Organisation:	The	Evolution	of	Salafi-Jihadism	and	the	
Emergence	of	the	Al	Qaeda	Ideology’,	in	Terrorism	and	Political	Violence	22	(2010)	no.	4,	p.	543.	
32	Idem	p.	542	
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facilitate	this	practice,	and	therefore	these	regimes	are	deemed	to	be	apostates	and	should	
be	defeated	as	well.33	
According	to	Salafists	this	was	all	proof	of	the	decline	of	the	Muslim	world,	and	various	
groups	sought	to	gain	political	leverage.	Most	of	these	groups	styled	themselves	to	the	image	
of	 the	 Egyptian	 Muslim	 Brotherhood.	 The	 Muslim	 Brotherhood	 sought	 to	 capture	 the	
apparatus	 of	 government	 (initially	 by	 participating	 in	 elections	 and	 by	 engaging	with	 the	
government),	 and	 use	 these	 institutions	 to	 impose	 Islamic	 law	 and	 restore	 “Gods	 rule.”34	
However,	Islamist	movements	across	the	Muslim	world	were	being	violently	repressed,	and	
many	 Islamists	 fled	 into	 exile	 to	 countries	 like	 Pakistan,	 Afghanistan	 or	 Europe.	 In	 exile,	
Islamists	became	radicalized	and	started	to	advocate	for,	and	helped	to	organize,	jihad	as	a	
means	to	achieve	regime	change.35	
The	term	Jihad	both	refers	to	a	personal	and	collective	duty	to	struggle	in	the	name	of	
Allah.	The	personal	aspect	of	jihad	is	concerned	with	resisting	temptations,	and	striving	to	be	
a	better	Muslim.	The	collective	effort	of	jihad	involves	bettering	one’s	community,	this	could	
include	defending	or	expanding	 it	by	means	of	war.	However,	warfare	 is	described	as	 the	
lesser	 jihad,	 improving	 oneself	 and	 one’s	 community	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 greater	 jihad.36	
Nonetheless,	as	 the	concept	of	 jihad	only	appears	 in	28	verses	 in	 the	Quran	 (out	of	6234	
verses	in	total),	the	concept	is	highly	contested.37	As	a	result,	the	concept	of	jihad	is	constantly	
being	 re-interpreted,	 deepened,	 and	 given	 new	purpose	 in	 light	 of	 contemporary	 events.	
When	 Salafists	 increasingly	 became	 concerned	 with	 what	 they	 viewed	 as	 Western	
encroachments	upon	Islamic	lands,	they	developed	it	in	to	a	concept	that	demands	armed	
struggle	against	the	West	and	the	apostate	Arab	regimes.38	
Before	 they	 could	 violently	 engage	 the	 Arab	 regimes,	 the	 Salafists	 needed	 to	 find	
religious	justification	because	the	Quran	prohibits	violence	against	fellow	believers.	Salafist	
Jihadists	 have	 for	 example	 re-interpreted	 the	 concept	 of	 takfir,	 which	 enables	 them	 to	
question	a	person’s	religious	belief	(iman)	and	to	deem	it	impure,	false	or	wrong.	Based	on	
this	they	can	then	declare	a	person	to	be	a	non-believer,	kafir,	which	allows	violence	against	
																																																						
33	B.	Haykel,	‘ISIS	and	al-	Qaeda—What	Are	They	Thinking?’,	p.	72.	
34	Idem	p.	73.		
35	Ibid.		
36	J.	Turner,	‘From	Cottage	Industry	to	International	Organisation’,	p.544.	
37	Ibid.		
38	Idem	pp.	547-553.	
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them.39	It	should,	however,	be	noted	that	this	too	is	a	highly	contested	concept	within	Islam,	
and	 that	most	 groups	 like	 the	 IS	 selectively	 quote	 verses	 from	 the	Quran	 to	 justify	 their	
actions.	 In	general,	 (Islamic)	scholars	agree	that	the	Quran	in	fact	prohibits	the	practice	of	
declaring	takfir	or	kafir	by	fellow	Muslims,	as	it	is	believed	that	such	a	sin	is	by	definition	one	
that	can	only	be	punished	in	the	afterlife.40	Still,	in	the	twentieth	century	notable	Salafists	like	
Sayyid	Qutb,	a	leading	member	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood,	and	Abul	A‘la	Maududi,	one	of	
the	founders	of	Pakistan’s	Jammat-e-Islami,	have	been	influential	in	developing	the	modern,	
anti-Western,	notion	of	takfir	and	kafir	as	a	way	to	justify	jihad	against	both	the	West	and	
those	Muslim	states	that	in	their	eyes	were	too	westernized.41	
The	practice	of	using	the	notions	of	takfir	and	kafir	to	justify	jihad	has	been	a	recurrent	
phenomenon	 by	 dissenting	 groups	 throughout	 the	 ages	 to	 justify	 their	 rebellion	 against	
legitimate	regimes.	As	it	has	been	noted,	in	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century	opposition	
amongst	 (Salafi)	 Muslims	 throughout	 the	 Islamic	 world	 was	 growing	 but	 was	 violently	
repressed.42	However,	the	Soviet	invasion	of	Afghanistan	(1979-1989),	amongst	other	events,	
would	provide	an	opportunity	for	both	Salafists	and	governments	to	address	their	respective	
issues.	It	is	in	this	climate	that	the	current	Salafist	Jihadist	organisations,	like	al-Qaeda,	have	
formed.		
		 	
3.3.	Al-Qaeda’s	Afghan	Origins		
	
The	origins	of	al-Qaeda	can	be	traced	back	to	the	Soviet	invasion	of	Afghanistan	(1979-1989),	
a	protracted	conflict	which	pitted	Soviet	and	Afghan	forces	against	a	popular	uprising	of	local	
fighters,	known	as	the	Mujahedeen.	Although	the	Mujahedeen’s	motivations	were	religiously	
inspired,	 their	 objectives	were	primarily	 local.43	During	 the	war	 the	Mujahedeen	 received	
support	from	foreign	fighters,	and	governments.	Islamic	countries	like	Pakistan,	Egypt,	and	
the	Gulf	States	all	sent	support	and	fighters	to	the	country.	In	addition,	the	United	States	soon	
started	 to	 back	 the	 Afghan	 resistance	 as	 well.	 While	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 the	 American	
																																																						
39	M.	Badar,	M.	Nagata,	T.	Tueni,	‘The	Radical	Application	of	the	Islamist	Concept	of	Takfir’,	in	Arab	Law	
Quarterly	31	(2017)	no.	2,	p.	133.	
40	Idem	pp.	133-135.		
41	Idem	p.	139.		
42	Ibid.		
43	Grau	L.	W.,	Gress	M.	A.,	The	Other	Side	of	the	Mountain:	Mujahideen	Tactics	in	the	Soviet-Afghan	War	
(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2002)	XXII-XXV.	
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involvement	in	the	Afghan	struggle	was	mostly	driven	by	Cold	War	politics,	the	support	from	
Muslim	majority	states	can	best	be	explained	by	shortly	discussing	pan-Islamism.44		
Pan-Islamism	 is	 a	Muslim	 ideology	 that	dates	back	 to	 the	nineteenth	 century,	 it	 is	
derived	from	the	idea	that	all	Muslims	constitute	one	people	(umma),	and	should	therefore	
protect	 each	 other	 from	 external	 threats.	 Pan-Islamism	 can	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 idea	 of	
(religious)	nationalism;	it	emphasizes	the	defence	of	the	Muslim	world	and	has	a	tendency	
towards	 self-victimization.	 For	 decades,	 pan-Islamism	 had	 especially	 been	 an	 important	
feature	of	Saudi	foreign	policy	and	it	became	especially	important	during	the	1980s.	This	can	
be	attributed	to	the	fact	that	the	Saudi	government	increasingly	had	to	deal	with	discontent	
amongst	its	people	(e.g.	Salafists).	The	Saudi	government	sought	to	divert	these	dissenting	
groups,	 and	 the	 war	 in	 Afghanistan	 provided	 an	 ample	 opportunity.	 Other	 Muslim	
governments	throughout	the	Middle-East	experienced	similar	problems,	which	is	why	they	
all	started	to	promote	a	populist	(or	extreme)	version	of	pan-Islamism.45	
Governments	across	the	Middle	East	encouraged	unwanted	radicals	to	participate	in	
the	war	 in	 Afghanistan	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 relieve	 pressures	 on	 their	 own	 regimes.	 The	 Saudi	
Arabians	organized	a	special	Afghan	support	committee	that	recruited	volunteers	amongst	
the	ranks	of	various	organizations,	such	as	the	Muslim	Brotherhood,	to	join	the	Mujahedeen	
in	Afghanistan.	One	of	 these	figures	was	Osama	bin-Laden,	a	member	of	a	wealthy	Saudi-
Yemeni	family,	who	would	become	a	key	figure	in	the	organization	of	the	Saudi	support	to	
the	 Afghan	 jihad.	 The	 Arab	 aid	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 many	 (radical)	 foreign	 fighters	 in	
Afghanistan,	 increasingly	 turned	 the	 war	 in	 Afghanistan	 into	 a	 jihad	 against	 the	 Soviet	
Union.46	
During	the	war,	Pakistan	served	as	a	gateway	for	foreign	support	to	the	Mujahedeen.	
Here,	 bin-Laden	 would	 co-found	Maktab	 al-Khidamat	 (MAK,	 “Offices	 of	 Services”).	 MAK	
served	as	a	recruitment	agency	for	Arab	volunteers	and	provided	them	with	assistance	upon	
arrival	in	Pakistan.47	MAK	contributed	greatly	to	the	radicalization	of	the	war	in	Afghanistan,	
as	its	leadership	produced	much	of	the	ideological	backing	for	the	jihad	in	Afghanistan,	and	
																																																						
44	B.	R.	Rubin,	Afghanistan	from	the	Cold	War	through	the	War	on	Terror	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	
2013)	pp.	77-78.	
45	T.	Hegghammer,	‘Islamist	Violence	and	Regime	Stability	in	Saudi	Arabia’	in	International	Affairs	(Royal	
Institute	of	International	Affairs	1944-),	84	(2008)	no.4,	pp.	703-704.	
46	Rubin,	‘Afghanistan	from	the	Cold	War	through	the	War	on	Terror’	p.	81.	
47	R.	K.	Cragin,	‘Early	History	of	Al-Qaida’,	in	The	Historical	Journal,	51	(2008)	no.	4,	pp.	1047.	
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subsequently	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 world.	 Abdullah	 Azzam	 (the	 other	 co-founder	 of	 MAK)	
published	a	religious	article	 in	which	he	differentiated	between	the	offensive	or	defensive	
jihad.	 Although	 at	 the	 time	 his	 writings	 supported	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 defensive	 jihad	 in	
Afghanistan,	his	work	would	 later	be	used	 to	 justify	attacks	against	 the	West.	Azzam	also	
stressed	the	fact	that	that	support	of	the	jihad	was	not	just	a	personal	responsibility,	but	a	
duty	 for	the	whole	Muslim	community.48	High	ranking	members	of	MAK	would	eventually	
come	to	constitute	the	core	of	al-Qaeda.49		
At	 first	 the	 so-called	 Afghan-Arabs	 took	 part	 in	 the	 various	 groups	 of	 Afghan	
Mujahedeen,	but	 towards	 the	end	of	 the	war	 they	 increasingly	 started	 to	 form	 their	own	
groups.	This	can	be	attributed	to	the	 fact	 that	 they	grew	 increasingly	dissatisfied	with	the	
infighting	among	the	Afghan	Mujahedeen,	but	also	to	the	fact	that	they	sought	to	expand	the	
jihad	beyond	Afghanistan.	 In	 the	 latter	half	of	 the	1980s,	 the	Arab	 fighters	 residing	 in	 the	
border	 region	between	Pakistan	 and	Afghanistan	 started	 to	 create	 their	 own	groups,	 and	
training	camps.50	Between	1986	and	1987,	Osama	bin-Laden	would	establish	one	of	these	
camps,	known	as	the	Lion’s	Den.	It	sought	to	exclusively	recruit	Saudi	mujahedeen	and	was	
constructed	in	close	proximity	of	a	Soviet	base.	There,	bin-Laden	and	his	followers	fought	a	
vicious	 battle	 against	 the	 Soviets,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 this	 battle	 gained	 bin-Laden	 the	
respect	that	he	later	used	to	create	his	own	group.51	
	
3.4.	From	Mujahedeen	to	Al-Qaeda	
	
	Although	disputed,	it	is	often	assumed	that	al-Qaeda	was	somewhat	formally	founded	on	18	
August,	1988	during	a	three-day	meeting	in	bin-Laden’s	Peshawar	house.52	Minutes	of	this	
meeting	were	found	at	a	Bosnian	Muslim	charity	in	2002.	the	time	of	its	founding	the	group	
was	mainly	focused	on	the	politics	of	the	jihadist	movement	within	Pakistan	and	Afghanistan,	
thus	 it	was	not	created	with	 the	sole	aim	of	waging	a	global	 jihad.53	However,	a	 series	of	
events	would	soon	change	this	attitude.		
																																																						
48	R.	K.	Cragin,	‘Early	History	of	Al-Qaida’,	pp.	1051-1052.	
49	Idem	p.	1047.	
50	Rubin,	‘Afghanistan	from	the	Cold	War	through	the	War	on	Terror’,	pp.	87-88.	
51	P.	Bergen,	P.	Cruickshank,	‘Revisiting	the	Early	Al	Qaeda:	An	Updated	Account	of	its	Formative	Years’,	in	
Studies	in	Conflict	&	Terrorism	35	(2012)	no.	1,	pp.	5-6.	
52		Idem	pp.	1-3.	
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	 Besides	growing	dissatisfied	with	the	infighting	among	the	Afghan	Mujahedeen,	
rifts	started	to	emerge	between	leading	figures	of	the	Afghan-Arabs.	For	example,	between	
bin-Laden	and	Azzam,	about	the	definition	of	jihad	and	whether	or	not	to	expand	the	jihad	
beyond	Afghanistan.54	 Even	 before	 al-Qaeda	 had	 been	 established,	 these	 discussions	 had	
emerged.	 Ayman	 al-Zawahiri,	 an	 Egyptian	 who	 had	 previously	 been	 the	 leader	 of	 the	
insurgency	group	Islamic	Jihad	in	Egypt,	was	important	with	regards	to	these	discussions.	Al-
Zawahiri	had	already	been	imprisoned	and	tortured	in	Egyptian	jails	before	making	his	way	to	
Afghanistan,	which	likely	influenced	his	notion	of	jihad.	Rather	than	defending	Muslim	lands	
from	 foreign	 invaders,	 al-Zawahiri	 emphasized	 the	 need	 to	 overthrow	 the	 apostate	
governments	 of	Arab	 countries.	 In	Afghanistan,	 al-Zawahiri	 and	bin-Laden	 reportedly	 also	
grew	closer.55	
	 The	withdrawal	of	Soviet	forces	from	Afghanistan	in	February	1989,	accelerated	
discussions	about	the	need	to	export	the	Afghan	jihad	to	other	places	in	need.	Bolstered	by	
the	fact	that	they	had	brought	down	a	superpower,	some	of	the	Afghan-Arabs	were	looking	
to	expand	the	jihad.	Bin-Laden	wanted	to	fight	in	Yemen,	which	was	at	the	time	governed	by	
communists.	 To	 this	 end	 bin-Laden	 travelled	 to	 Saudi-Arabia	 in	 1989,	 while	 one	 of	 his	
confidants	was	sent	to	Sudan	to	discuss	the	possibility	of	setting	up	a	base	there.56	Up	until	
then,	it	looked	like	al-Qaeda	was	hoping	to	expand	its	Afghan	jihad	to	other	Muslim	countries	
who	 in	 their	vision	also	needed	 liberation.	The	United	States,	or	 the	West	 in	general,	had	
largely	been	absent	 in	discussions	among	the	 jihadists.	The	 invasion	of	Kuwait	by	Saddam	
Hussein’s	Iraq,	would	change	this	discussion.57	
	 When	Iraqi	forces	invaded	Kuwait	in	1990,	Saudi	Arabia	called	the	United	States	
for	 help.	 As	 a	 result,	 thousands	 of	 US	 soldiers	 were	 stationed	 on	 the	 Arabian	 Peninsula.	
Although	 the	American	 troops	were	 stationed	 in	 Islam’s	holy	 land	 to	protect	 it	 from	 Iraqi	
attacks,	many,	 including	bin-Laden,	viewed	their	presence	as	an	 invasion.58	Attention	thus	
gradually	started	to	shift	to	the	United	States,	yet	for	a	while	bin-Laden	stayed	focused	on	
other	fights.	Attention	was	again	drawn	to	the	United	States	when	the	Americans	started	to	
																																																						
54	R.	K.	Cragin,	‘Early	History	of	Al-Qaida’,	pp.	1053-1056.	
55	Idem	pp.	1053-54.		
56	Idem	pp.	1056-1057.		
57	Idem	pp.	1057-1058.	
58	Idem	p.	1058.	
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express	their	concerns	about	the	security	situation	in	Somalia.59	To	bin-Laden	this	signaled	
that	 the	Americans	were	again	getting	ready	to	 intervene	 in	Muslim	 lands.	Soon	al-Qaeda	
started	to	train	and	fund	Somali	 fighters	 in	anticipation	of	the	American	 intervention.	Bin-
Laden	hoped	that	an	American	defeat	in	Somalia	would	lead	them	to	completely	withdraw	
from	the	Muslim	world.	60	
	
3.5.	The	Road	to	9/11		
	
After	 its	 founding	 in	 1988,	 Osama	 bin-Laden	 and	 other	 high-ranking	 al-Qaeda	 members	
travelled	around	the	Middle-East	in	search	for	a	new	base	and	a	new	cause.	From	1992-1996	
bin-Laden	is	said	to	have	resided	in	Sudan,	where	he	began	to	implement	a	new	vision	of	al-
Qaeda.	While	 in	the	previous	period	much	of	al-Qaeda’s	activities	had	still	 focused	on	the	
fight	in	Afghanistan	and	the	training	of	other	jihadists	groups,	in	Sudan	the	organization	began	
to	emphasize	the	need	to	spread	its	operations,	influence	and	expertise	to	different	jihadist	
fronts	across	the	world.	In	addition,	as	previously	described,	al-Qaeda	began	to	think	about	
targeting	the	United	States.61	
	 In	an	effort	to	fight	the	Americans,	al-Qaeda	sent	fighters	to	Somalia	since	US	
forces	had	been	active	in	this	country	as	part	of	the	United	Nations	mission	to	stabilize	the	
country,	which	had	been	embroiled	in	a	civil	war.	However,	they	seem	to	have	been	largely	
ineffective,	as	they	failed	to	set	up	a	safe	base	and	forge	allegiances	with	local	groups	like	
they	had	enjoyed	in	Afghanistan.62	Still,	al-Qaeda	took	great	credit	over	the	withdrawal	of	US	
forces	 from	 Somalia	 in	 1994.	Moreover,	 in	 1993	 the	 first	 al-Qaeda-linked	 terrorist	 attack	
against	the	United	States	was	carried	out,	when	a	truck	bomb	exploded	in	the	basement	of	
the	World	Trade	Centre	in	New	York.	Although	the	explosion	failed	to	bring	about	the	collapse	
of	the	World	Trade	Centre,	six	people	died	and	about	a	thousand	people	were	injured.63	No	
direct	 involvement	 of	 al-Qaeda’s	 leadership	 has	 been	 established,	 but	 the	 terrorists	 who	
carried	out	the	attack	had	trained	with	al-Qaeda	in	Afghanistan.64		
																																																						
59	R.	K.	Cragin,	‘Early	History	of	Al-Qaida’,	pp.	1059-1060	
60	Ibid.	
61	P.	Bergen,	P.	Cruickshank,	‘Revisiting	the	Early	Al	Qaeda’,	pp.	18-19.		
62	Idem	pp.	19-20.	
63	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation,	‘First	Strike:	Global	Terror	in	America’,	by	FBI,	retrieved	June	23,	2017	from:	
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608.	
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	 In	1993	al-Qaeda	began	to	plan	its	own	attacks	against	US	targets,	it	would	take	
five	years	before	they	were	being	executed	but	this	time	the	al-Qaeda	leadership	was	heavily	
involved.65	Before	the	U.S.	embassies	in	Kenia	and	Tanzania	were	attacked,	Osama	bin-Laden	
increased	his	criticism	of	the	Saudi	government	for	backing	the	communist	forces	in	Yemen.	
The	Saudi	government	responded	by	revoking	his	passport	and	by	forcing	his	(wealthy)	family	
to	 disown	 him.	 Moreover,	 the	 Saudi	 government	 led	 the	 international	 discussion	 that	
pressured	 the	 Sudanese	 government	 into	 expelling	 bin-Laden	 and	 his	 followers	 from	 the	
country.	When	bin-Laden	declared	a	jihad	against	the	‘Judeo-Christian	alliance’	(the	U.S.	and	
Israel)	in	1996,	he	and	his	organization	had	returned	to	Afghanistan66.		
	 In	Afghanistan,	al-Qaeda	enjoyed	the	protection	of	the	Taliban,	who	had	come	
to	power	in	the	wake	of	the	civil-war	that	had	followed	after	the	Soviet	withdrawal	from	the	
country.67	 There,	 bin-Laden	 was	 joined	 by	 his	 soon-to-be	 second	 in	 command,	 Ayam	 al-
Zawahiri.	Zawahiri	had	not	been	part	of	al-Qaeda	since	its	formation	in	1988,	but	had	instead	
returned	to	Egypt	to	resume	his	fight	against	the	Egyptian	government.	However,	this	fight	
proved	to	be	increasingly	difficult	and	his	organization	almost	ceased	to	exist.	When	he	too	
returned	to	Afghanistan	Zawahiri	pledged	his	allegiance	to	bin-Laden.68	With	its	leadership	
safe	in	Afghanistan,	al-Qaeda	carried	out	the	attacks	on	the	U.S.	embassies	in	Dar-es-Salaam	
and	Nairobi,	killing	257	people.69	The	US	quickly	retaliated	against	al-Qaeda	by	firing	a	number	
of	Tomahawk	cruise	missiles	against	what	was	presumed	to	be	a	gathering	of	senior	jihadists	
in	Afghanistan	hosted	by	bin-Laden.	Although	 the	missiles	caused	massive	destruction,	al-
Qaeda	was	quick	to	announce	that	bin-Laden	had	been	unhurt	and	safe.70		
	 	
3.6.	9/11	and	the	Globalization	of	Jihad	
	
After	the	1998	embassy	bombings,	al-Qaeda	had	positioned	itself	as	a	transnational	terrorist	
organization	 and	 it	 had	 gained	 the	 attention	 of	 other	 jihadist	 groups	 but	 also	 from	 US	
intelligence	agencies.	In	1999,	a	year	after	the	successful	embassy	bombings,	bin-Laden	and	
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his	aides	started	to	plot	the	9/11	attacks.	By	killing	dozens	of	Americans	in	their	homeland	
they	hoped	 to	 force	 the	United	States	 into	 completely	withdrawing	 their	 troops	 from	 the	
Muslim	 lands.	 Little	did	 they	 know	 that	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	attacks	 the	United	States	
would	only	become	more	present	in	the	region.71	
	 After	months	 of	 careful	 planning,	 on	 11	 September,	 2001	 19	 hijackers	 took	
control	of	 four	U.S.	 commercial	 flights.	Two	of	 these	 flights	 crashed	 into	 the	World	Trade	
Centre	in	New	York	City,	one	of	the	planes	crashed	into	the	Pentagon	in	Washington	D.C.	and	
a	 fourth	one	crashed	 just	outside	of	Shanksville,	Pennsylvania.	 In	 total,	2977	people	were	
killed	in	the	single	most	destructive	attack	on	U.S.	soil	since	Pearl	Harbour.72	With	this	attack	
al-Qaeda	once	more	hoped	to	force	an	American	‘withdrawal’	from	Muslim	countries,	and	
though	they	expected	a	retaliation	attack	they	did	not	expect	 the	United	States	 to	 invade	
Afghanistan.73	This	proved	to	be	a	serious	miscalculation	as	the	United	States	was	quick	to	
announce	‘Operation	Enduring	Freedom’,	which	sought	to	topple	the	Taliban	regime,	destroy	
al-Qaeda,	 and	 bring	 peace	 and	 development	 to	 Afghanistan	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
country	would	no	longer	be	a	safe	haven	for	terrorists.74	
	 Within	weeks	the	Taliban	and	al-Qaeda	had	been	defeated,	and	most	of	their	
fighters	and	 leadership	either	 fled	 the	 country	or	went	 into	hiding.	 Senior	Taliban	and	al-
Qaeda	members	 took	 refuge	 in	Pakistan’s	Federally	Administered	Tribal	Areas,	 the	 largely	
ungoverned	and	mountainous	border	area	between	Pakistan	and	Afghanistan.75	From	their	
hideouts	 in	 this	 region,	al-Qaeda	entered	a	new	phase,	 in	which	 they	 increasingly	 formed	
alliances	with	local	groups	or	established	local	affiliates.	It	can	thus	be	said	that	the	U.S.-led	
invasion	 of	 Afghanistan	 has	 aided	 the	 globalization	 of	 the	 al-Qaeda	 brand.	 Terrorist	
organizations	throughout	the	world	pledged	their	allegiance	to	al-Qaeda	and	bin-Laden,	or	
merged	with	one	of	al-Qaeda’s	local	branches.76		
Al-Qaeda	especially	started	to	expand	after	2003.	This	can	be	attributed	to	the	fact	
that	the	U.S.	had	to	redirect	part	of	its	military	and	intelligence	assets	to	Iraq,	following	the	
2003	invasion	of	the	country.	As	a	result,	the	al-Qaeda	leadership	in	hiding	was	given	some	
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breathing	 space.	 Moreover,	 the	 Iraq	 invasion	 provided	 fresh	 material	 for	 al-Qaeda’s	
propaganda.77	Al-Qaeda	Central78	established	a	number	of	official	affiliates:	Al-Qaeda	in	the	
Islamic	Maghreb	 (AQIM,	 operating	 in	 Northern	 Africa)	 Al	 Shebaab	 (active	 in	 Somalia	 and	
Yemen)	and	Al	Qaeda	in	the	Arabian	Peninsula	(AQAP,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Yemen)	in	addition	
to	a	number	of	smaller,	more	loosely	associated	groups.	In	2004	al-Qaeda	would	also	establish	
an	affiliate	in	Iraq,	which	would	eventually	turn	into	the	Islamic	State.79	
	
3.7.	The	Islamic	State’s	Iraqi	Origins		
	
The	founding	of	 the	group	that	would	become	known	as	 the	 IS	can	be	traced	back	to	 the	
Jordanian	 jihadist	 Abu	Mus’ab	 al-Zarqawi.	 In	 1999	 Zarqawi	made	 his	way	 to	 Afghanistan,	
where	he	set	up	a	military	training	camp	to	train	a	jihadist	group	of	his	own.	While	he	had	
been	 in	 contact	with	Osama	bin-Laden’s	 al-Qaeda,	 the	 two	organizations	did	not	develop	
close	relations	at	that	time.	Rather,	it	would	already	become	apparent	that	the	two	groups	
aspired	to	different	goals.	While	al-Qaeda	was	aiming	to	overturn	the	global	establishment	
by	military	force,	Zarqawi	is	said	to	have	spent	considerable	time	and	effort	into	building	a	
complete	social	structure	and	governing	bodies.80		
	 In	 Afghanistan,	 Zarqawi	 managed	 to	 establish	 a	 large	 following,	 mainly	
consisting	of	exiled	Islamists	from	Jordan,	Palestine	and	Syria.	In	2001,	when	the	country	was	
invaded	by	 the	US-led	coalition,	Zarqawi	and	his	men	 left	Afghanistan.	Zarqawi	eventually	
settled	down	in	Northern	Iraq	where	he	began	to	establish	a	network	of	smuggling	routes,	
safe	houses,	and	weapons	caches	in	anticipation	of	the	American	invasion	of	the	country	in	
2003.	By	that	time,	Zarqawi’s	group,	by	then	known	as	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad,	had	established	
a	large	following,	mainly	consisting	of	foreign	fighters.	Moreover,	the	network	of	smuggling	
routes	 and	 safe	 houses	 would	 allow	 the	 organization	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 carefully	 planned	
insurgency	against	the	US-led	coalition.81	
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	 After	Saddam	Hussein’s	forces	had	been	defeated	by	the	coalition	forces,	the	
disgruntled	 Sunni	 population	 of	 Iraq	 launched	 an	 insurgency.	 Out	 of	 the	 five	 distinct	
organizations	 that	 took	 part	 in	 the	 insurgency,	 Zarqawi’s	 group	was	 the	 one	 that	mostly	
consisted	of	foreign	fighters.	In	addition,	many	former	members	of	the	Iraqi	military,	who	had	
been	 disbanded	 by	 the	 US-led	 coalition	 after	 they	 had	 been	 defeated,	 had	 joined	 his	
organization.82	 The	 strategy	 focused	 on	 alienating	 U.S.	 coalition	 forces,	 deterring	 Iraqi	
cooperation	by	targeting,	for	example,	the	police	and	by	disrupting	the	rebuilding	process	by	
targeting	humanitarian	aid	workers.	In	addition,	his	group	targeted	Iraqi	Shiites,	hoping	that	
retaliatory	 responses	 against	 the	 Sunni	 population	 would	 trigger	 sectarian	 conflict.83	
Moreover,	 Zarqawi	 was	 already	 floating	 the	 idea	 of	 establishing	 an	 Islamic	 state	 in	 the	
region.84	 Zarqawi’s	 group	 would	 gain	 prominence	 during	 the	 Iraqi	 insurgency,	 especially	
because	of	his	ruthless	use	of	suicide	bombings,	and	the	online	publishing	of	videos	of	their	
attacks.85	
	 As	a	result	of	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad’s	success,	al-Qaeda	became	interested	in	the	
group	and	the	two	organizations	formalized	their	relationship	in	October	2004	when	Zarqawi	
announced	his	allegiance	to	bin-Laden	and	renamed	his	group	to	Tanzim	Qaidat	al-Jihad	Bilad	
al-Ra-dayn,	or	 al-Qaeda	 in	 Iraq	 (AQI).	 It	 can	be	argued	 that	 al-Qaeda’s	 central	 leadership,	
hiding	 in	 the	 tribal	 areas	of	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan,	was	attracted	 to	 the	group	 since	 it	
provided	them	with	an	opportunity	to	rise	to	prominence	again	after	they	had	kept	a	 low	
profile	for	a	while.	For	Zarqawi,	the	alliance	with	al-Qaeda	provided	him	with	prestige	as	well	
as	access	to	fresh	recruits	and	funds.86	It	should,	however,	be	noted	that	this	alliance	was	far	
from	being	a	convenient	one,	as	al-Qaeda’s	central	leadership	was	already	wary	of	Zarqawi’s	
use	of	 suicide	bombings,	 and	 the	 targeting	of	 the	 Shia	 population.	 They	 feared	 that	 such	
attacks	would	diminish	the	popular	support	of	the	Iraqi	 insurgency,	 in	part	because	of	the	
collateral	deaths	of	civilians	 (including	Sunni’s).	 In	addition,	 they	feared	that	the	excessive	
attacks	on	Shiites	would	lead	to	retaliatory	actions	of	Iran,	which	at	the	time	held	a	lot	of	al-
Qaeda	fighters	in	prison.87	
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	 Indeed,	the	violent	tactics	and	indiscriminate	attacks	had	already	alienated	large	
parts	of	the	(Sunni)	 Iraqi	population	when	Zarqawi	was	killed	 in	a	U.S.	airstrike	on	7	June,	
2006.	In	the	summer	of	2006,	Sunni	tribesmen	began	a	covert	campaign	to	kill	AQI	members,	
in	 a	 campaign	 that	 became	known	as	 the	Awakening	Movement.	 In	 conjunction	with	 the	
Awakening	Movement	the	US	deployed	more	troops	(2007)	to	supress	AQI’s	insurgency,	and	
eventually	they	were	even	paying	many	of	the	Sunni	tribesmen	who	were	fighting	AQI.	As	a	
result	of	these	combined	efforts	AQI	ranks	were	shrinking,	while	at	the	same	time	the	flow	of	
foreign	fighters	joining	its	ranks	dried	up.88		
	 In	an	effort	to	regain	popular	support	AQI	changed	its	leadership	and	name	in	
the	 fall	 of	 2006	 to	 the	 Islamic	 State	 of	 Iraq	 (ISI).	 However,	 counterterrorism	 forces	 kept	
pursuing	the	organization	and	in	April	2010	the	leadership	was	killed	in	a	counterterrorism	
operation.	 From	 then	 on	 the	 organization	was	 headed	 by	 its	 current	 leader	 Abu	 Bakr	 al-
Baghdadi,	who	 inherited	an	organization	 that	 can	be	said	 to	have	been	 in	disarray.89	Still,	
within	four	years	the	organization	would	again	become	an	existential	threat	to	Iraq	and	the	
wider	 region.	 To	 resurrect	 the	 organization	 al-Baghdadi	 initiated	 two	 carefully	 planned	
campaigns,	known	as	the	‘breaking	the	walls’	and	the	‘soldiers	harvest’	campaigns.	The	civil	
war	in	Syria	also	provided	an	opportunity	for	the	organization	to	increase	its	strength.90	
	
3.8.	From	the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	to	the	Worldwide	Caliphate		
	
On	 21	 July,	 2012,	 Abu	 Bakr	 al-Baghdadi	 announced	 the	 start	 of	 the	 breaking	 the	 walls	
campaign,	an	operation	that	was	aimed	at	freeing	fellow	militants	from	prisons.	At	the	same	
time	the	campaign	involved	a	series	of	sustained	vehicle-borne	improvised	explosive	device	
(VBIED)	attacks	aimed	at	the	Iraqi	security	forces	and	the	Shia	population	of	Iraq.	During	the	
campaign	eight	prisons	were	attacked.	Although	not	all	attacks	were	successful	ISI	managed	
to	free	several	hundred	militants	over	the	course	of	a	year.91	The	prison	breaks	did	not	only	
																																																						
88	M.J.	Kirdar,	‘Al-Qaeda	in	Iraq’,	p.	5.		
89	Ibid.	
90	J.	D.	Lewis	‘Al-Qaeda	in	Iraq	Resurgent:	the	Breaking	the	Walls	Campaign,	Part	1’,	in	Middle	Eastern	Security	
Report	(2013)	no.	14,	pp.	7-10.	
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succeed	 in	 freeing	AQI	members,	 they	 also	helped	 spread	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 Iraqi	 security	
forces	were	incompetent.92	
	 The	campaign	concluded	on	21	July,	2013	and	was	soon	to	be	followed	by	the	
soldiers	harvest	 campaign.	During	 this	 campaign	 ISI	 specifically	 targeted	 the	 Iraqi	 security	
forces,	in	an	effort	to	instil	fear	and	nervousness	in	them.	It	consisted	of	targeted	killings	of	
both	on	and	off-duty	security	force	members,	the	demolition	of	their	homes,	and	attacks	on	
checkpoints.	 These	 attacks	 also	 served	 to	 further	 diminish	 the	 public’s	 confidence	 in	 the	
security	forces.	Arguably	ISI	also	hoped	that	the	Iraqi	security	forces,	which	are	predominantly	
Shia,	 would	 retaliate	 against	 the	 Sunni	 population,	 thereby	 further	 increasing	 sectarian	
tensions	in	the	country.93	
	 Indeed,	as	a	result	of	these	actions	the	Iraqi	government	(dominated	by	Shiites)	
was	forced	to	respond	with	force	and	ISI	managed	to	capitalize	on	such	actions	by	reinforcing	
sectarian	 tensions.	 While	 in	 previous	 years	 Iraq’s	 Sunni	 tribes	 had	 fought	 against	 ISI’s	
precursors,	they	now	willingly	joined	its	ranks.94	The	civil	war	in	Syria	would	provide	another	
opportunity	for	ISI	to	increase	its	fighting	capabilities.	In	2012,	ISI	expanded	its	activities	to	
Syria	by	 setting	up	 training	camps	and	by	establishing	a	Syrian	chapter,	 Jahbat	al-Nusra.95	
Moreover,	ISI	was	successful	in	recruiting	among	the	thousands	of	foreign	fighters	that	made	
their	way	 to	 Syria	 to	 participate	 in	 the	war	 against	 Assad.	When	 ISI	 launched	 its	 surprise	
offensive	in	Iraq,	which	culminated	in	the	attack	and	capture	of	Mosul	on	6	June,	2014,	it	was	
in	 large	 part	 carried	 out	 by	 forces	 it	 had	 trained	 in	 Syria.96	 After	 its	 June	 offensive,	 ISI	
controlled	 large	 parts	 and	 cities	 in	 Syria	 and	 Iraq.	 From	 this	 position,	 it	 announced	 the	
restoration	 of	 the	 Caliphate	 and	 rebranded	 its	 name	 to	 the	 Islamic	 State,	 Abu	 Bakr	 al-
Baghdadi	was	pronounced	to	be	the	Caliph	Ibrahim.97		
	 Soon	after	 the	Caliphate	had	been	established,	 the	 Islamic	State’s	 leadership	
urged	Muslims	throughout	the	world	to	pledge	allegiance	to	the	new	Caliph,	a	custom	known	
																																																						
92	Idem	pp.	20-21.	
93	M.	Knights,	‘ISIL’s	Political-Military	Power	in	Iraq’,	in	CTC	Sentinel,	7	(2014)	no.	8,	p.	2.		
94	A.	N.	Celso,	‘Zarqawi’s	Legacy:	Al-Qaeda’s	ISIS	“Renegade”’,	in	Mediterranean	Quarterly	26	(2015)	no.	2,	p.	
27.		
95	Jahbat	al-Nusra	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter,	which	covers	the	split	between	al-Qaeda	
and	ISI.		
96	M.	Knights,	‘ISIL’s	Political-Military	Power	in	Iraq’,	p.	2.	
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as	bay’a.	Such	a	pledge	not	only	acknowledges	the	new	Caliph	to	be	the	rightful	leader	of	the	
Muslim	world,	 it	also	places	 the	 individual	or	group	making	 the	pledge	under	 the	Caliph’s	
direct	command.	If	these	groups	control	any	territories	these	will	become	official	provinces	
(wilayats)	 of	 the	 Islamic	 State.	 Although	 the	 practice	 is	 highly	 contested	 throughout	 the	
Muslim	world,	a	large	number	of	individuals,	scholars,	and	militant	groups	have	made	their	
pledge.98	However,	all	pledges	have	to	be	officially	accepted	by	the	caliph,	thus	the	IS	can	be	
selective	in	accepting	the	offers	of	bay’a.99	Groups	like	Nigeria’s	Boko	Haram,	Afghanistan’s	
al-Tawheed	Brigade	in	Khorasan,	and	the	Philippines’	Jemaah	Islamiyah,	have	all	pledged	their	
allegiance.	Arguably	the	IS’s	network	stretches	from	Western	Africa,	through	Eastern	Africa,	
the	Middle-East,	South/Southeast	Asia	all	the	way	to	the	remote	islands	of	the	Philippines.100	
	
3.9.	The	Split	Between	al-Qaeda	and	the	Islamic	State	
	
After	an	inconvenient	marriage	of	nearly	ten	years,	al-Qaeda	Central	finally	broke	ties	with	
the	IS	in	February	2014.	However,	the	timing	of	the	split	seems	a	bit	strange,	as	it	occurred	at	
a	time	when	Baghdadi’s	group	was	becoming	increasingly	powerful	in	both	Syria	and	Iraq.	To	
understand	why	al-Zawahiri	broke	ties	with	the	Islamic	State,	and	even	encouraged	resistance	
against	them,	this	next	section	will	review	some	of	the	strategic	differences	between	the	two	
organizations.	In	addition,	the	disagreement	over	the	status	of	Jahbat	al-Nusra,	which	can	be	
said	to	be	the	direct	reason	behind	their	2014	dispute,	will	be	discussed.		
	 Arguably,	 the	main	difference	between	al-Qaeda	and	 the	 IS,	 is	 the	way	 they	
perceive	 the	Middle	East	 as	a	 theatre	 for	operations.	Although	both	organizations	preach	
global	jihad	and	the	establishment	of	an	Islamic	Caliphate,	al-Qaeda	seems	to	have	concluded	
that	 the	 Middle	 East	 requires	 a	 different	 set	 of	 operational	 codes.	 Al-Qaeda	 appears	 to	
acknowledge	that	indiscriminate	attacks	on	the	civil	population	might	harm	their	cause,	as	
the	 establishment	 of	 a	 Caliphate	 requires	 winning	 the	 hearts	 and	 minds	 of	 the	 (local)	
population.101	 For	example,	 al-Qaeda’s	 central	 leadership	was	already	 critical	of	 Zarqawi’s	
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99	D.	Milton,	M.	al-‘Ubaydi,	‘Pledging	Bay`a’,	pp.	2-5.		
100	Idem	pp.	1-4;	CTC	Sentinel,	‘CTC’s	interactive	Islamic	State	Bay`a	Timeline’	(no	date).	Retrieved	June	27	
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extreme	use	of	violence	and	strict	enforcement	of	sharia	law	right	after	his	group	had	joined	
al-Qaeda	in	2004.		They	feared	that	this	behavior	might	hurt	the	long-term	goals	of	the	global	
jihadist	 project.	 Arguably,	 this	 difference	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 al-Qaeda’s	 central	
leadership	advocated	overturning	the	apostate	governments	of	the	Middle	East,	as	a	way	to	
purify	 Islam,	 while	 Zarqawi	 was	 more	 focused	 on	 purging	 society	 from	 the	 kafirs	
(unbelievers).102	
	 While	al-Qaeda’s	central	leadership	disapproved	of	the	IS’s	actions	and	extreme	
use	of	violence,	they	still	aspire	similar	goals.	 It	should	therefore	be	noted	that	al-Qaeda’s	
decision	to	disavow	the	IS’s	use	of	extreme	violence	is	likely	a	more	strategic	choice,	instead	
of	a	show	of	sympathy	towards	the	more	secular	Muslims.	It	can	be	argued	that	al-Qaeda’s	
central	 leadership	 had	 taken	 note	 from	 past	 experiences,	 for	 example	 the	 previously	
mentioned	Awakening	Movement,	which	almost	 led	to	the	demise	of	AQI,	and	the	fate	of	
Algeria’s	Armed	Islamic	Group	(AIG).	Before	its	reorganization	and	affiliation	to	al-Qaeda,	the	
AIG	 had	 conducted	 a	 campaign	 of	 violence	 against	 civilians,	 intellectuals,	 foreigners	 and	
journalists,	which	had	sparked	condemnation	from	throughout	the	Muslim	world	and	almost	
led	to	its	downfall.103	
	 Surprisingly,	 al-Qaeda’s	 decision	 to	 break	with	 the	 IS	 can	 also	 be	 said	 to	 be	
inconsistent	with	their	long-term	strategy.	Before	conducting	the	9/11	attacks,	al-Qaeda	had	
already	laid	out	a	strategic	plan	for	their	global	jihad.	The	plan	includes	seven	phases	to	be	
executed	over	the	course	of	twenty	years,	and	culminates	in	the	establishment	of	a	global	
Caliphate.	The	first	stage,	which	included	the	terror	attacks	of	9/11,	was	titled	the	‘awakening’	
and	sought	to	provoke	a	US	attack	on	the	Muslim	world.	Stage	2	(‘opening	the	eyes’)	and	3	
(‘arising	and	standing	up’)	included	attacks	on	Western	forces	in	the	Middle-East,	attacks	on	
secular	Muslim	 states	 and	 on	 Israel,	 and	 sought	 to	 enable	 the	 ‘downfall	 of	 the	 apostate	
Muslim	regimes’	(stage	4,	countries	like	Saudi	Arabia,	Jordan).	The	first	four	stages	would	then	
lead	to	the	‘declaration	of	the	Caliphate’	(stage	5),	followed	by	the	‘total	confrontation’	(stage	
6,	all-out	war	between	Muslims	and	non-Muslims).	By	2020	al-Qaeda	hoped	to	have	reached	
stage	7,	‘definitive	victory’,	and	the	establishment	of	the	worldwide	Caliphate.104	
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	 In	retrospect,	much	of	this	strategic	plan	can	be	said	to	have	been	more	or	less	
successful.	 The	 terror	 attacks	 on	 9/11	 led	 to	 the	 American	 war	 on	 terrorism	 and	 to	 the	
subsequent	invasions	of	Afghanistan	and	Iraq,	which	were	perceived	by	many	in	the	Middle	
East	to	be	evidence	of	modern-day	crusades.	Additionally,	for	a	moment	the	popular	revolts	
during	the	Arab	Spring	seemed	to	bring	down	those	apostate	governments	that	had	been	in	
power	for	so	long.105	The	civil	war	in	Syria	provided	an	opportunity	for	al-Qaeda	to	capitalize	
on	 these	 dissatisfactions	 and	once	more	 take	 control	 of	 territory	 in	 a	 largely	 ungoverned	
country.		It	can	thus	be	argued	that	al-Qaeda	welcomed	al-Baghdadi’s	decision	to	send	one	
of	his	close	deputies,	the	Syrian	jihadist	Abu	Muhammad	al-Jawlani,	to	the	country.	In	Syria,	
al-Jawlani	set	up	his	own	organization	which	became	known	as	Jabhat	al-Nusra.106	
In	Syria,	al-Nusra	would	soon	become	one	of	the	best	organized	and	successful	rebel	
groups.	Moreover,	the	organization	seemed	to	spend	considerable	attention	to	obtaining	the	
support	of	the	local	population	under	its	control,	by	combining	military	force	with	responsible	
governance	 and	 charitable	 operations.107	 In	 2013,	 al-Baghdadi	 sought	 to	 expand	 his	 own	
organizations	activities	to	Syria	and	even	announced	a	merger	between	his	organization	and	
al-Nusra,	and	rebranded	the	organization	the	IS	of	Iraq	and	al-Sham	(ISIS).		Both	al-Jawlani	
and	al-Zawahiri	denounced	al-Baghdadi’s	decision,	as	Al-Jawlani	claimed	that	he	had	never	
been	consulted	about	this	merger.	Al-Zawahiri	denounced	the	merger	on	the	note	that	al-
Nusra	and	ISI,	which	he	still	viewed	as	local	al-Qaeda	branches,	should	both	focus	on	their	
own	 respective	 geographic	 regions:	 Syria	 and	 Iraq.108	 Al-Baghdadi	 refused	 to	 listen	 to	 al-
Zawahiri	and	rapidly	expanded	his	operations	 in	Syria,	eventually	pitting	his	 forces	against	
other	militant	groups.	In	the	meantime,	al-Zawahiri	sought	to	reconcile	ISIS	and	al-Nusra	and	
to	restrain	al-Baghdadi.	However,	the	killing	of	one	of	his	chief	mediators	forced	him	to	finally	
disavow	al-Baghdadi	and	to	denounce	the	IS.109	
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4.	Analysis		
	
4.1.	Introduction		
	
The	previous	chapters	have	shown	how	both	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS	rose	to	power,	why	the	two	
organizations	 formed	 an	 alliance	 with	 each	 other	 and	 why	 their	 cooperation	 ended	 and	
became	a	rivalry.	The	next	part	of	this	thesis	will	analyse	this	relationship	by	using	the	theories	
on	cooperation	and	competition	that	have	been	discussed	in	the	literature	review.	In	order	
to	structure	the	analysis,	 it	will	be	 limited	to	three	events:	al-Qaeda’s	decision	to	 form	an	
alliance	with	the	IS’s	predecessor	in	2004;	the	split	in	2014;	the	aftermath	of	the	split	2014-
2017.		
	
4.2.	Al-Qaeda’s	Affiliates		
	
In	 chapter	 2.5	 and	2.6	 it	 has	 been	described	how	al-Qaeda	became	 the	 foremost	 jihadist	
organizations	 in	 the	 world.	 During	 the	 1990s	 al-Qaeda	 provided	 training	 and	 (financial)	
support	 to	 individuals	 and	 organizations	 across	 the	 globe.	 This	 served	 bin-Laden’s	 initial	
objective	to	spread	the	Afghan	jihad	to	the	rest	of	the	Muslim	world.	During	this	period	al-
Qaeda	provided	training	to	other	 jihadist	 (organizations)	or	provided	them	with	(financial)	
support.	Although	no	formal	alliances	were	made	during	this	period,	 it	can	be	argued	that	
these	activities	laid	the	groundwork	for	what	was	to	become	al-Qaeda’s	worldwide	network	
in	the	early	2000s.		
	 Nonetheless,	 during	 this	 period	 some	 benefits	 that	 are	 associated	 with	
cooperation	 can	 already	 be	 observed.	 Especially	 to	 smaller	 organizations,	 their	 loose	
affiliation	with	al-Qaeda	provided	vital	resources	(financial	and	human)	which,	according	to	
the	theories	of	for	example	Philips,	should	have	helped	them	to	survive	and	hence	increased	
their	 longevity.110	Additionally,	according	to	the	theories	of	Horowitz	and	Craign,	al-Qaeda	
training	 camps	 in	Afghanistan	and	Sudan	 furthermore	 facilitated	 the	 spread	of	 al-Qaeda’s	
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interpretation	of	Salafist	Jihad	ideology	and	the	use	of	operational	tactics.111	According	to	the	
literature,	upon	their	return	to	their	home	countries,	individuals	who	trained	at	these	camps	
are	 likely	 to	 have	 contributed	 to	 increasing	 levels	 of	 lethality	 of	 their	 respective	 terror	
groups.112	
	 The	2001	attacks	against	the	US	further	increased	al-Qaeda’s	leadership	position	
among	 the	 jihadist	 movements.	 However,	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 attacks,	 al-Qaeda	 was	
nearly	exterminated	by	the	US-led	coalition	and	had	to	retreat	to	the	mountainous	border	
region	of	Afghanistan	 and	Pakistan.113	Al-Qaeda’s	 ability	 to	 survive	 during	 this	 period	 can	
certainly	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 area	 in	 which	 they	 were	 hiding	 was	 hard	 to	
penetrate,	but	it	is	also	evidence	of	strong	organizational	ties	and	commitment	to	the	jihadist	
cause.	 Al-Qaeda’s	 survival	 during	 this	 period	 can	 also	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	
established	a	number	of	local	affiliated	groups	during	this	period,	drawing	from	the	networks	
that	had	been	established	during	 the	1990s.	 In	 chapter	2.6	 it	has	been	mentioned	how	a	
number	of	groups	started	to	operate	under	the	al-Qaeda	umbrella,	attacks	by	these	groups	
helped	 the	 al-Qaeda	 brand	 to	 survive.	 AQC	 decision	 to	 form	 alliances	 can	 thus	 best	 be	
explained	 by	 the	 need	 to	 survive	 this	 precarious	 period	 and	 clearly	 illustrates	 how	
cooperation	between	terrorist	groups	can	increase	longevity.114	
	 The	formalization	of	alliances	allowed	al-Qaeda	to	continue	their	global	jihad,	
even	 though	 the	 central	 leadership	 continued	 to	 be	 under	 pressure	 and	 in	 isolation	 in	
Afghanistan	and	Pakistan.	The	decision	to	form	an	alliance	with	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	in	2004	
can	 in	part	be	explained	by	this	 ‘survivalist’	strategy	as	 it	provided	another	opportunity	to	
attack	Western	 forces.115	However,	as	has	been	explained	 in	 chapter	2.7,	 the	 relationship	
between	the	two	organizations	was	already	characterized	with	disagreements	even	before	
being	 formalized	 and	 al-Qaeda’s	 leadership	 was	 reluctant	 in	 supporting	 Zarqawi’s	
indiscriminate	 insurgency.	 Instead,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 AQC’s	 decision	 to	 formalize	 an	
alliance	 with	 Zarqawi	 was	 in	 part	 also	 driven	 by	 motivations	 which	 are	 typically	 found	
between	competing	groups.	For	that	reason,	this	thesis	proposes	to	view	the	alliance	between	
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AQC	and	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	(and	later	the	IS),	as	a	‘competitive	alliance’,	which	allows	for	
an	analysis	 that	 takes	 into	account	 features	 from	both	cooperative	as	well	as	competitive	
relationships.			
	 Especially	with	regards	to	AQC	it	can	be	argued	that	their	motivations	to	form	
and	maintain	an	alliance	with	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	were	in	part	driven	by	characteristics	that	
are	usually	associated	with	competition.	Arguably,	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	presented	a	threat	to	
AQC	because	they	both	competed	over	a	similar	pool	of	recruits	and	support.	In	contrast	to	
Afghanistan,	where	AQC	was	still	under	heavy	pressure	from	the	US-led	coalition,	the	(urban)	
theatre	in	Iraq	allowed	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	to	carry	out	its	ruthless	insurgency.	Al-Tawhid	wal-
Jihad	promoted	 its	operations	by	producing	countless	propaganda	videos	of	 their	actions,	
which	they	perfected	by	the	time	they	rose	to	power	as	the	IS.	The	IS	would	make	very	clever	
use	of	social	media	platforms	to	get	their	message	across.	While	at	the	time	AQC	still	relied	
on	older	forms	of	media,	such	as	delivering	videotaped	messages	to	television	stations	like	al-
Jazeera.116	As	a	result,	thousands	of	foreign	fighters	were	joining	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	in	Iraq,	
and	 AQC	 likely	 felt	 that	 they	were	 losing	 their	 leadership	 position	 of	 the	 Salafist	 Jihadist	
movement.		
	 In	an	effort	to	maintain	its	leadership	position,	AQC	made	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	
an	official	affiliate	and	tolerated	its	ruthless	bombing	campaign.	As	has	been	noted,	AQI	would	
not	 only	 target	 coalition	 forces	 but	 also	 Shia	Muslims,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 spark	 a	 sectarian	
conflict.	AQI	in	addition	targeted	Sunni	Muslims	who	they	felt	were	not	religious	enough.117	
While	AQC	disapproved	such	actions,	as	they	ran	counter	to	some	of	their	own	objectives,	it	
can	be	argued	that	the	outbidding	thesis	too	helps	to	explain	why	they	nevertheless	allowed	
them.	 According	 to	 Kydd	 and	 Walter	 the	 escalating	 violence	 that	 often	 characterizes	
outbidding	are	often	designed	to	show	determination	and	power.118	Hence	it	can	be	argued	
that	 AQC	 allowed	 the	 indiscriminate	 suicide	 attacks	 of	 AQI	 because	 they	 demonstrated	 a	
strong	commitment	to	the	Jihadist	cause,	which	they	sought	to	dominate.		
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2015),	retrieved	October	10,	2017	from:	http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-
jihadism%E2%80%99s-global-civil-war-12304.		
117	Ibid.		
118	A.	H.	Kydd,	B.	F.	Walter,	‘The	Strategies	of	Terrorism’,	p.	77.		
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4.3.	The	Split	Between	al-Qaeda	and	the	Islamic	State		
	
In	chapter	2.7	it	has	been	described	why	al-Qaeda	broke	its	ties	to	the	IS	in	2014.	As	has	been	
described,	this	decision	can	be	said	to	be	the	result	of	direct	events	such	as	IS’s	decision	to	
expand	their	operations	to	Syria	and	announce	a	merger	with	al-Nusra.	However,	explaining	
this	decision	through	the	lens	of	competition	or,	as	has	been	proposed	in	the	previous	section,	
a	competitive	alliance,	will	likely	shed	more	light	on	this	event.		
Baghdadi’s	 decision	 to	 send	 al-Jawlani	 to	 Syria	 to	 establish	 a	 local	 al-Qaeda	
chapter	was	at	first	welcomed	by	AQC.	It	provided	the	opportunity	to	take	control	of	territory	
and	to	implement	their	vision	of	Islamic	governance.	Arguably	this	sentiment	was	also	driven	
by	motivations	that	were	similar	to	AQC’s	decision	to	make	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	an	official	
affiliate	in	2004,	by	capitalizing	on	the	Syrian	civil	war	it	allowed	al-Qaeda	to	once	more	show	
that	they	were	the	best	jihadist	organization	in	the	world.	In	Syria,	al-Jawlani’s	al-Nusra	Front	
would	 compete	 with	 other	 rebel	 groups	 and	 soon	 became	 one	 of	 the	 most	 lethal	
organizations	operating	in	the	country.		
Al-Nusra’s	successes	in	Syria	can	clearly	be	attributed	to	the	benefits	of	being	
affiliated	with	AQC	and	AQI	as	both	organizations	provided	fighters	and	expertise	in	addition	
to	financial	support.	As	such	the	case	of	al-Nusra	illustrates	how	cooperation	can	increase	the	
lethality	as	well	as	endurance	of	a	group.119	As	has	been	described	by	Horowitz	and	Craign,	
al-Nusra’s	actions	in	Syria	also	illustrate	how	cooperation	can	facilitate	the	diffusion	of	tactics.		
Given	the	fact	that	al-Nusra	was	an	AQI	affiliate,	and	AQI	was	known	for	its	suicide	bombings	
in	 Iraq,	 this	notion	helps	to	explain	why	al-Nusra	adopted	this	tactic	 in	Syria,	even	though	
other	 organizations	 in	 the	 country	 did	 not	 use	 the	 tactic.120	 Furthermore,	 the	 theory	 of	
outbidding	helps	to	explain	why	these	Syrian	organizations	adopted	the	use	of	suicide	attacks	
after	 al-Nusra	 had	 carried	 out	 several	 of	 these	 attacks	 in	 Syria.	 Nemeth	 has	 for	 example	
explained	how	competition	between	groups	will	force	them	to	adopt	more	radical	and	deadly	
tactics,	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 group	 coherence	 and	 display	 determination	 to	 aspiring	
																																																						
119	See	for	example:	N.	A.	Bapat,	K.	D.	Bond,	‘Alliances	between	Militant	Groups’,	p.	795;	B.	J.	Phillips,	‘Terrorist	
Group	Cooperation	and	Longevity’,	p.	337.	
120	See	for	example:	M.	C.	Horowitz,	‘Nonstate	Actors	and	the	Diffusion	of	Innovations’,	pp.	35-37;	K.	Craign,	
Sharing	the	Dragon's	Teeth:	Terrorist	Groups	and	the	Exchange	of	New	Technologies.		
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recruits.121	 Furthermore	Kydd	and	Walter’s	notion	of	 terrorist	 outbidding	 further	helps	 to	
explain	how	the	Syrian	civil	war	experienced	escalating	levels	of	violence	even	before	the	IS	
made	its	way	in	to	the	country.122	
When	Baghdadi	announced	his	decision	that	his	organization	would	move	 its	
operations	into	Syria	and	would	merge	with	al-Nusra	front,	both	the	latter	organization	and	
AQC	 were	 surprised	 and	 dissatisfied.123	 Baghdadi’s	 decision	 clearly	 exposed	 the	 limits	 to	
terrorist	 cooperation.	 To	 some	 degree	 the	 decision	 displayed	what	 Bapat	 and	 Bond	 have	
called	 the	commitment	problem,	which	 is	 caused	by	a	 lack	of	 transparency	and	 therefore	
credibility.124	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 IS,	 AQC	 and	 al-Nusra	 front	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
commitment	problem	reinforced	the	problems	associated	with	the	security-autonomy	trade-
off.125	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 factors,	 Baghdadi’s	 decision	 was	 ill-perceived	 by	 the	 other	
organizations	and	caused	the	alliance	to	crumble.		
While	the	limits	of	cooperation	help	explain	why	Baghdadi's	decision	led	to	the	
split	between	AQC	and	IS,	it	can	also	be	argued	that	the	announcement	brought	to	light	the	
slumbering	competition	between	AQC	and	IS	(AQI,	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad).	Such	an	explanation	
echoes	Philips’	notion	of	 terrorist	 cooperation,	as	he	argued	 that	 cooperation	can	 lead	 to	
dependence	 or	 competition.126	 Moreover,	 it	 reinforces	 the	 suggestion	 that	 the	 alliance	
between	AQC	and	the	IS	can	be	viewed	as	a	‘competitive	alliance’.	 In	2004,	AQC	struck	an	
alliance	with	the	IS’s	predecessor	in	fear	of	losing	its	leadership	position	among	the	jihadist	
movements.	In	2014,	it	can	be	argued	that	they	ended	the	relationship	because	they	could	
no	longer	control	their	ally,	and	once	more	feared	losing	their	leadership	position	over	the	
global	jihad	as	the	IS	rapidly	expanded	in	both	Syria	and	Iraq.	This	would	also	explain	why	AQC	
went	to	great	lengths	to	denounce	and	discredit	the	organization.127	
																																																						
121	S.	Nemeth,	’The	Effect	of	Competition	on	Terrorist	Groups’,	p.	337.	The	claim	that	al-Nusra	introduced	the	
use	of	suicide	attacks	in	the	Syrian	war	is	based	on	information	by	START’s	Global	Terrorism	Database:	
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&sta
rt_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&sAttack=1&success=yes&country=200&region=10&weapon
=6&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=3&count=100#results-table.	Note:	the	first	two	suicide	attacks	are	suspected	
to	be	carried	out	by	AQI,	likely	by	the	network	that	would	turn	in	to	al-Nusra.		
122	A.H.	Kydd,	B.F.	Walter,	’The	Strategies	of	Terrorism’,	p.	77.		
123	D.	Byman,	J.	Williams,	‘ISIS	vs.	Al	Qaeda:	Jihadism’s	Global	Civil	War’,	p.	3.		
124	N.A.	Bapat,	K.D.	Bond,	’Alliances	between	Militant	Groups’,	p.	794.		
125	T.	Bacon,	’Alliance	Hubs’,	pp.	7-8.	
126	Philips,	’Terrorist	Group	Cooperation	and	Longevity’,	p.	337.		
127	T.	R.	Hamming,	‘The	Al	Qaeda–Islamic	State	Rivalry:	Competition	Yes,	but	No	Competitive	Escalation’,	in	
Terrorism	and	Political	Violence	(2017)	pp.	7-9.		
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4.4.	The	Aftermath	of	the	Split:	Competition	between	al-Qaeda	and	the	Islamic	State		
	
In	the	period	after	the	IS’s	proclamation	of	the	Caliphate	and	AQC’s	decision	to	disavow	the	
organization,	 the	 competition	 between	 the	 two	 organizations	 has	 become	 visible	 in	 the	
following	fields:	as	a	challenge	to	each	other’s	authority	and	as	a	challenge	to	each	other’s	
territorial	control.	The	remainder	of	this	thesis	will	discuss	some	noteworthy	events	which	
shed	light	on	these	aspects	of	the	competition	between	AQC	and	the	IS.		
When	 it	 comes	 to	 challenging	 each	 other’s	 authority,	 the	 IS’s	 decision	 to	
proclaim	a	Caliphate	in	Syria	and	Iraq	and	to	promote	its	leader	al-Baghdadi	to	the	rank	of	
Caliph	has	been	the	greatest	challenge	to	al-Qaeda’s	leadership	position	of	the	global	jihad.	
With	 this	 decision,	 the	 IS	 not	 only	 claimed	 great	 prestige	 but	 it	 also	 claimed	 religious	
authority,	and	encouraged	other	groups	and	individuals	to	make	a	pledge	of	allegiance	to	al-
Baghdadi.	Therefore,	the	IS	put	a	lot	of	effort	into	promoting	Baghdadi	as	the	rightful	Caliph.	
For	example,	they	circulated	a	reconstruction	of	the	genealogy	of	his	tribe,	which	traced	his	
lineage	back	to	the	Prophet	Muhammad’s	direct	descendants.128		
On	the	other	hand,	while	al-Qaeda	had	taken	pledges	from	a	number	of	groups	
and	 individuals	 before,	 including	 Zarqawi,	 it	 never	 explicitly	 claimed	 a	 leadership	 role	 or	
religious	authority.	In	fact,	bin-Laden	had	made	a	pledge	of	allegiance	to	Mullah	Omar,	the	
leader	of	the	Taliban	and	the	Emir	of	Afghanistan,	during	the	1990s.	This	pledge	of	allegiance	
was	reaffirmed	by	al-Zawahiri	during	the	summer	of	2014.129	Besides	repeating	its	allegiance	
to	Mullah	Omar,	Zawahiri	also	challenged	Baghdadi’s	legitimacy	as	Caliph	by	declaring	that	
the	 newly	 established	 al-Qaeda	 in	 the	 Indian	 Subcontinent	 would	 too	 work	 under	 the	
leadership	of	Mullah	Omar,	who	he	called	“the	commander	of	the	faithful”.130		
While	al-Qaeda	sought	to	reaffirm	its	leadership	role	over	the	global	jihad,	by	
pointing	to	past	successes	and	past	allegiances,	or	by	referring	to	Mullah	Omar	as	the	only	
																																																						
128	W.	McCants,	’The	Believer:	How	an	introvert	with	a	passion	for	religion	and	soccer	became	Abu	Bakr	al-
Baghdadi	leader	of	the	Islamic	State’,	by	The	Brookings	Essay	(September	1,	2015),	retrieved	November	27,	
2017	from:	http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2015/thebeliever.html.		
129	J.M.	Berger,	‘The	Islamic	State	vs.	al	Qaeda:	Who’s	winning	the	war	to	become	the	jihadi	superpower?’,	by	
Foreign	Policy	(September	2,	2014),	retrieved:	November	27,	2017	from:	
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/02/the-islamic-state-vs-al-qaeda/.	
130	E.	Karmon,	’Islamic	State	and	al-Qaeda	Competing	for	Hearts	&	Minds’,	in	Perspectives	on	Terrorism	9	
(2015)	no.	2,	p.	71.	
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true	religious	authority,	the	IS	nevertheless	received	a	number	of	pledges	of	allegiance.	As	a	
result	of	these	pledges,	the	IS	expanded	its	network	beyond	its	core	in	Syria	and	Iraq	and	even	
received	pledges	from	groups	which	before	had	been	(loosely)	affiliated	with	AQC.	As	splinter	
factions	 of	 AQIM,	 AQAP	 and	 al-Qaeda	 groups	 in	 Afghanistan	 have	 made	 pledges	 to	 al-
Baghdadi,	the	IS	threatens	al-Qaeda’s	presence	in	vital	areas.131	Even	though	the	theory	of	
outbidding	 predominantly	 explains	 increasing	 levels	 of	 violence	 when	 terrorist	 groups	
compete,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	theory	can	also	be	applied	to	al-Qaeda’s	and	the	IS’s	efforts	
to	assert	their	dominance	over	the	global	jihadist	movement	as	both	groups	sought	to	outdo	
each	other.		
In	Syria,	al-Nusra	has	also	tried	to	win	over	public	support	by	presenting	itself	as	
less	extreme	than	the	IS.	It	has	put	great	emphasis	on	charitable	events	such	as	the	collection	
of	the	zakat	(charitable	donations	as	required	by	Islamic	law)	and	its	distribution	to	the	needy,	
the	organization	and	hosting	of	communal	events,	such	as	competitions,	iftar	meals,	group	
prayers	and	celebrations	during	 the	Ramadan.132	As	part	of	 this	charm	offensive,	al-Nusra	
publicly	 announced	 its	 dis-affiliation	 with	 al-Qaeda,	 if	 in	 name	 only,	 a	 move	 that	 was	
coordinated	and	welcomed	by	AQC.	Subsequently,	Al-Nusra	changed	its	name	to	Jabhat	Fath	
al-Sham	and	sought	rapprochement	to	other	rebel	groups	in	Syria.133	As	Bacon	has	argued,	
being	 affiliated	 with	 other	 terrorist	 groups	 can	 increase	 pressure	 from	 counterterrorism	
forces,	it’s	therefore	also	possible	that	al-Nusra’s	disengagement	from	al-Qaeda	was	intended	
to	relieve	this	pressure.134	
Besides	this	war	of	words,	al-Qaeda	(through	its	local	affiliate	al-Nusra)	and	the	
IS	have	also	clashed	with	each	other	in	Syria.	Especially	in	the	oil-rich	province	of	Deir	Ezzor,	
the	IS	and	al-Nusra	have	fought	each	other,	forcing	the	latter	group	to	retreat	to	other	parts	
of	Syria.	While	the	IS	was	ruthlessly	expanding,	not	only	attacking	al-Nusra	and	government	
forces,	but	also	moderate	and	Islamist	rebels,	al-Nusra	has	been	able	to	enlist	the	support	of	
a	number	of	other	rebel	groups	in	Syria.	It	needs	no	explanation	that	these	clashes	are	clear	
																																																						
131	J.M.	Berger,	‘The	Islamic	State	vs.	al	Qaeda’,	pp.	3-4;	A.	Y.	Zelin,	‘The	War	between	ISIS	and	al-Qaeda’,	p.	6.			
132	C.	Anzalone,	’The	Multiple	Faces	of	Jabhat	al-Nusra/Jabhat	Fath	al-Sham	in	Syria’s	Civil	War’,	in	Insight	
Turkey	18	(2016)	no.	2,	pp.	43-45.		
133	Idem	pp.	49–50.		
134	T.	Bacon,	‘Alliance	Hubs’,	pp.	7-8.	
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examples	of	the	competition	between	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS.135	Moreover,	shortly	after	their	
falling	out,	members	from	both	al-Nusra	and	other	al-Qaeda	affiliates	defected	to	the	IS	or	
the	other	way	around.136	According	to	Staniland’s	theory,	the	case	of	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS	thus	
clearly	shows	signs	of	fratricide	as	the	groups	not	only	competed	with	each	other	in	a	war	of	
words	but	also	on	the	ground	over	members,	territory	and	resources.137		
Still,	 even	 though	Staniland	predicts	 that	 this	 can	have	a	negative	 impact	on	
organizations,	and	lead	to	their	demise,	this	theory	arguably	does	not	(completely)	apply	to	
al-Nusra	and	the	IS.	While	the	two	organizations	have	been	fighting	throughout	much	of	2014,	
fighting	largely	ceased	when	the	two	had	consolidated	their	(new)	territories.	While	this	could	
be	part	of	a	‘live	and	let	live’	strategy	adopted	by	both	groups,	it’s	more	likely	that	this	is	due	
to	 increased	 pressure	 from	 third	 parties.	 After	 September	 2014,	 the	 IS	 started	 to	 face	
difficulties	 as	 the	 Obama	 administration	 created	 an	 international	 coalition	 to	 fight	 the	
organization.138	Soon,	airstrikes	would	hit	the	IS	at	a	daily	basis,	hampering	its	expansion	and	
eventually	reversing	much	of	its	territorial	gains.	On	the	other	hand,	al-Nusra,	or	Jabhat	Fath	
al-Sham,	again	changed	its	name	in	the	summer	of	2017	after	having	merged	with	other	rebel	
groups.	The	newly	established	Hayat	Tahrir	al-Sham	again	sought	to	distance	itself	from	al-
Qaeda	 in	 order	 to	 (re)gain	 popular	 support.	 Still	 al-Qaeda	 and	 al-Nusra	 elements	 remain	
active	in	the	group	and	while	they	have	been	able	to	maintain	a	stable	presence	in	Syria’s	
north-western	 regions,	 pressure	might	 soon	 amount	 as	 Assad’s	 forces	 are	 freed	 up	 after	
defeating	the	IS.139	
	
																																																						
135	The	Economist,	‘Two	Arab	Coutnries	Fall	Apart’,	The	Economist	(June	12,	2014)	retrieved	November	27,	
2017	from:	https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21604230-extreme-islamist-group-
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Post	(August	9,	2014)	retrieved	November	29,	2017	from:	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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2014)	retrieved	November	30,	2017	from:	https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/middleeast/us-and-
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Conclusion		
	
This	thesis	has	sought	to	explain	why	al-Qaeda	ended	its	alliance	with	the	IS	in	2014,	at	a	time	
when	the	latter	organization	was	becoming	increasingly	more	powerful.	While	a	narrative	of	
this	split	has	been	constructed	through	statements	and	actions	from	both	organizations,	such	
an	explanation	is	naturally	politicized.	Instead,	this	work	has	sought	to	explain	al-Qaeda’s	and	
the	IS’s	break	up	through	the	lens	of	terrorist	cooperation	and	competition.	Theories	about	
these	types	of	relationships	have	described	why	terrorist	organizations	engage	in	these	kinds	
of	affairs	and	what	the	benefits	and	risk	of	them	are.		
	 This	work	has	described	how	al-Qaeda	established	itself	as	the	central	jihadist	
organization	throughout	the	1990s,	but	was	nearly	exterminated	after	its	attacks	against	the	
US	 in	 2001.	 Forced	 into	 hiding	 al-Qaeda	 started	 to	 formalize	 alliances	 and	 established	
affiliated	groups.	It	has	been	argued	how	al-Qaeda	established	these	relationships	in	an	effort	
to	maintain	momentum	and	keep	its	leadership	position	over	the	global	jihad.	Hence,	it	has	
been	noted	that	al-Qaeda	employed	cooperation	as	a	strategy	of	survival	during	this	period.	
However,	when	al-Qaeda	formed	an	alliance	with	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad,	the	IS’s	predecessor,	
it	has	been	argued	that	other	motivations	too	played	a	role.	
	 In	2004,	when	the	insurgency	against	the	US-led	coalition	in	Iraq	started	to	gain	
momentum,	 al-Tawhid	 wal-Jihad	 was	 fast	 becoming	 the	 most	 feared	 organization	 in	 the	
country.	Apart	from	motivations	that	are	associated	with	cooperation,	this	thesis	has	argued	
that	al-Qaeda’s	decision	to	make	this	organization	an	affiliate	was	also	driven	by	motivations	
that	 are	 typically	 found	with	 competition	between	groups.	As	 it	 has	been	argued	 that	 al-
Qaeda	felt	they	were	losing	their	leadership	position	to	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad.	Hence,	this	thesis	
has	proposed	to	view	this	relationship	through	the	lens	of	a	competitive	alliance,	which	draws	
characteristics	 from	 both	 cooperation	 and	 competition	 between	 groups.	 Apart	 from	
explaining	why	al-Qaeda	decided	to	turn	al-Tawhid	wal-Jihad	into	an	affiliate,	even	though	
they	already	disagreed	on	major	ideological	points	and	methods	of	operation,	the	notion	of	
a	competitive	alliance	also	helps	to	explain	why	the	two	groups	broke	off	ties	in	2014.		
	 In	 2014,	 the	 IS	 was	 not	 only	 becoming	more	 powerful,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	
leadership	of	al-Qaeda	still	was	 in	hiding,	 the	 IS	also	started	to	 ignore	commands	from	al-
Qaeda’s	leadership.	The	IS	declared	an	unannounced	merger	with	Jahbat	al-Nusra,	al-Qaeda’s	
L.	Walter	 S1910205	 	
	
37	
	
(or	AQI’s)	affiliate	in	Syria.	Both	AQC	and	al-Nusra	refuted	this	move	and	the	IS	was	told	to	
confine	its	actions	to	Iraq.	After	mediation	in	this	conflict	failed,	since	the	IS	refused	to	give	in	
to	 AQC	 leadership,	 al-Qaeda	 was	 forced	 to	 break	 of	 ties	 with	 the	 IS	 and	 denounce	 the	
organization.	This	incident	clearly	illustrated	the	limits	to	terrorist	cooperation,	as	has	been	
described	by	Bapat,	Bond	and	Bacon.	The	conflict	between	al-Qaeda	and	the	IS	thereafter	
showed	 clear	 signs	 of	 terrorist	 outbidding	 as	 have	 been	 described	 by	 Nemeth,	 Kydd	 and	
Walter.	In	a	war	of	words	both	organizations	sought	to	promote	themselves	as	the	foremost	
jihadist	organization.	On	the	ground	in	Syria,	the	clashes	between	al-Nusra	and	the	IS,	and	
attacks	on	other	rebel	groups,	led	to	escalating	levels	of	violence	in	Syria’s	civil	war.		
	 The	thesis	has	found	that	even	though	Staniland’s	theory	about	fratricide	would	
predict	that	the	competition	between	the	two	organizations	could	severely	damage	them,	
this	notion	fails	to	completely	address	the	situation.	Major	clashes	between	al-Nusra	and	the	
IS	ended	in	2014,	after	which	the	former	organization	consolidated	itself	in	regions	that	were	
separated	from	the	IS’s	territories.	At	the	same	time,	the	IS	was	increasingly	being	pushed	
back	as	a	result	of	an	international	coalition	fighting	them.	The	IS’s	loses	can	therefore	better	
be	attribute	to	this	third-party	intervention,	instead	of	being	ascribed	to	fratricide.		
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